THE FATE OF RAOUl WALLENBERG – GAPS IN THE OFFICIAL RECORD

Photo Credit: Raoul Wallenberg’s photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm. Source: The Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

1. The text is authored by Dr. Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger. It presents an enlarged version with additional new data of the paper by Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, entitled “Das Schicksal Raoul Wallenbergs – Die Wissenslücken.” Auf den Spuren Wallenbergs, Stefan Karner (Hg.). Innsbruck (Austria): StudienVerlag, 2015. S. 117-141; the previous English version of the short paper with the title “The Fate of Raoul Wallenberg: Gaps in Our Current Knowledge” is available at http://www.vbirstein.com. Many of the questions cited in this document were raised in some form previously, by various experts and researchers. Some have received partial answers, but not to the degree that they could be removed from this list of open questions and requests.
Preamble

The story of the Swedish businessman and diplomat Raoul G. Wallenberg who went to Hungary in 1944 to protect the Jews of Budapest from Nazi persecution seamlessly links the two defining events of the 20th Century, the Holocaust and the Cold War. Young and idealistic, he fought one totalitarian regime (Nazism) only to fall victim to another (Stalinism). The full circumstances of his fate after March 11, 1947, the last confirmed date of his presence in the Soviet prison system — have never been established and the search for him continues.

Raoul Wallenberg’s actions during the height of the violence in Budapest, from October 1944 until January 1945, are proof of his extraordinary spirit. Countless witnesses have testified that they owe their lives in large part to his personal courage and organizational talents. Appointed in June 1944 as a First Secretary to the Swedish Legation, he merged the courageous fight of the Hungarian resistance with diplomatic aid efforts of other neutral countries into an extraordinarily effective rescue apparatus.

In the middle of January 1945, Raoul Wallenberg and his driver, Vilmos Langfelder, made contact with Soviet troops in order to seek assistance for the Jews under Swedish protection. Instead of receiving a friendly welcome, Wallenberg and Langfelder were detained and transferred to Moscow, never to be seen again.

Seven decades have now passed since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared in the Soviet Union.

Although the Soviet state ceased to exist twenty-five years ago, Raoul Wallenberg’s family still has not received answers to their most pressing questions:

Why was Raoul Wallenberg arrested and why was he never released? And what exactly happened to him in the summer of 1947, after his trail breaks off in Moscow’s Lubyanka Prison?

As early as 1990-91, an international commission, led by Wallenberg’s brother Guy von Dardel, working closely with Russian experts and officials, was able to confirm that both Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder had been imprisoned in the Soviet Union during the years 1945 -1947.

Later, a bilateral Swedish-Russian Working Group that investigated the Wallenberg case from 1991 until 2000 managed to expand on these findings, but concluded its investigation without obtaining full clarity about Wallenberg’s fate. Unfortunately, many of the documents released by the Russian side of the Working Group were heavily censored and important collections remained altogether inaccessible for most researchers.

Since 2001, new documentation has emerged from Russian archives that previously had not been shared with researchers.

Among other things, these documents raise the important question if Raoul Wallenberg could have been held as “Prisoner no. 7” in the Lubyanka Prison in 1947; and if he possibly remained there some time after July 17, 1947, his alleged date of death, according to Soviet authorities.

A few years ago, researchers learned that contrary to previous claims, the Archival-Investigation File of Raoul Wallenberg’s longtime cellmate, the German diplomat Willy Rödel, has been largely preserved.
This fact and other archival data strongly suggest that similar investigative material was also created in the Wallenberg case. Some of this documentation may have been destroyed, but some of it may well continue to exist to this day.

In 2012, in connection with the Raoul Wallenberg centenary, the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (former Russian Foreign Ministry Archive) released almost 7,000 diplomatic cipher cables sent between Stockholm and Moscow in the years 1944-1947. This was an important step and the material has yielded some helpful insights.

The emergence of this new information underscores the fact that important material with direct relevance to the question of Raoul Wallenberg’s fate continues to be found in Russian archival collections.

Independent researchers have not been allowed full access to most of these and other essential files so far, often in violation of current Russian law and international agreements.

Other withheld material includes papers that could help to properly identify “Prisoner no. 7,” who was interrogated in Lubyanka Prison on July 23, 1947, and who, according to the archivists of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), may have been Raoul Wallenberg.

Vital questions persist about the Soviet era system of isolating and numbering prisoners (both under investigation and after sentencing) during the years 1947-53. Russian officials have also yet to provide complete information about all Swedish prisoners who were incarcerated in Vladimir Prison during the 1950s and early 1960s. This material is urgently needed to either corroborate or dismiss the statements of witnesses who claimed to have met Raoul Wallenberg after 1947.

Just as importantly, researchers have not been permitted to examine Russian intelligence files that could provide valuable insights into the reasons for Wallenberg’s arrest. These include Soviet foreign and military intelligence reports from Hungary in 1944-45, detailing the activities of the Swedish Legation, Budapest. Soviet intelligence reports from Stockholm, Sweden for the years 1944-47, including thousands of cipher cables, also remain strictly classified.

Some of these documents are known to exist in the FSB Central Archive (TsA FSB), in the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Archive and in the Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). So far, neither agency has allowed an independent review.

Similar severe restrictions have prevented the study of internal correspondence records of the Soviet Security Services and the Soviet leadership. The same is true for the official investigation files of specific prisoner.

And despite repeated requests, important collections in the Russian Federation Presidential Archive (AP RF), especially certain records of the Politburo, have not been made available to independent experts.

It has become increasingly clear that if direct and unhindered access to this documentation were granted, the Wallenberg case could almost certainly be solved.
We respect Russia’s secrecy and privacy laws, but they must be properly applied and should not stand in the way of discovering the fate of a true hero of the Holocaust.

**Research approach**

Researchers are focusing their requests on documentation that can reasonably serve to advance the still unsolved question of what exactly happened to Raoul Wallenberg in Soviet captivity. This includes questions about his personal background and activities in Hungary which need to be examined further.

Over the years, we have requested documentation we know to exist in Russian archives, but which we have not been allowed to review. Wherever possible, we have asked for direct access to original documents, not copies. In the light of recent disclosures, it is clear that our concern about the edited or censored documentation we have often been restricted to is well founded.

In 2009, FSB archivists announced that Raoul Wallenberg could have been alive as late as July 23, 1947.\(^2\) However, important follow-up questions and requests have remained unanswered. Other critical gaps exist in the materials provided by the Russian side during the official investigation of Raoul Wallenberg's fate by the Swedish-Russian Working Group during the 1990s. In fact, several important archives have never been approached.

Below we summarize this and other key gaps in the official record that, in our opinion, are crucial for a successful investigation of the case. It is our sincere hope that with the joint expertise of Russian and international scholars, it will finally be possible to close these gaps and to discover what exactly happened to Raoul Wallenberg.

May 2016

[Signatures]

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\(^2\) This date was established as a result of a series of inquiries of two researchers, Dr. Vadim Birstein and Susanne Berger, made to the FSB Central Archive.
I. FSB Archival Materials

The still pending questions discussed below about missing archival materials regarding the fate of Raoul Wallenberg and his driver Vilmos Langfelder require a short explanation of their arrest in Budapest and the investigation in Moscow that followed.

On January 14, 1945 Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder were detained without an arrest warrant in the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, commander) near Budapest and then brought to Moscow on February 6, 1945, by operatives of the Soviet military counterintelligence called SMERSH (an abbreviation of the Russian phrase “Death to Spies”). SMERSH existed from May 1943 to April 1946, and was headed by State Security Commissar of the 2nd Rank, later Colonel General Viktor Abakumov, who reported directly to the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.⁴

In Moscow, Wallenberg and Langfelder were in custody of the 2nd Department of the GUKR SMERSH (Military Counterintelligence Main Directorate, SMERSH’s headquarters), headed by Colonel Sergei Kartashov.⁵ Officers of the 1st Section within that department were in charge of interrogations of German-speaking prisoners listed under this 2nd Department. Prisoners were kept and interrogated in two main Moscow State Security Commissariat (NKGB) prisons, called Inner (or Lubyanka) and Lefortovo, since the GUKR SMERSH did not have its own interrogation prisons.⁶

In April 1946, the GUKR SMERSH was merged with the NKGB and the united organization was called the State Security Ministry or MGB (KGB predecessor); Abakumov was appointed MGB Minister. Within the MGB, the GUKR SMERSH became the MGB 3rd Main Directorate (military counterintelligence). Nikolai Selivanovsky, one of Abakumov’s deputies, headed this Main Directorate; he personally was involved in the investigation of the Raoul Wallenberg case.

In the new structure, Kartashov’s department became the 4th Department within the MGB 3rd Main Directorate, and the officers of the former 2nd GUKR SMERSH Department continued interrogations within this 4th Department. At the end of 1948, Kartashov’s 4th Department was disbanded. Later, in 1950, most of its former officers were transferred to the 5th Section of the 2-K Department (investigation) of the 2nd Main Directorate (interior counterintelligence). In 1951-52, investigators of this section closed cases of most of the prisoners who had been Wallenberg and Langfelder’s cellmates from 1945 to 1947.

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⁵ The work of Kartashov’s department is described in ibid.
⁶ All Soviet security organizations mentioned in this paper, the NKVD (Interior Affairs Commissariat), NKGB (State Security Commissariat) that in 1946 became the MGB (State Security Ministry), and the GUKR SMERSH (military counterintelligence from 1943-46), dealt with the so-called “counterrevolutionary” crimes, that, in fact, were political crimes punished only under Articles 58 and 59 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. See Birstein. SMERSH, Stalin’s Secret Weapon. Pp. 54-57.
Before going to a detailed description of missing parts in archival documentation kept in the FSB Central Archive, it is necessary to mention that the FSB almost never released full copies of documents, but only copies of fragments “extracted” from the text (for instance, one line or even a part of it from the whole page). These “extracts” have never been compared with the originals by independent researchers.

Unfortunately, during the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group from 1991 to 2000, only some of the originals were shown to the Chairman of the Swedish side of the Working Group, Ambassador Hans Magnusson. Russian archival authorities did not permit independent verification. Therefore, these released copies cannot be considered as authentic archival documents.

1. Interrogation Registers and “Prisoner no. 7”

1) Background Facts

Independent researchers have repeatedly asked the FSB Central Archive for full information about the interrogations of prisoners who knew about Raoul Wallenberg and his driver Vilmos Langfelder or had met the two men. The interrogations took place in both Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons, on the night of July 22/23, 1947 — an event that is of central importance for the Wallenberg Case.

In November 2009, in reply to a formal research request, FSB archivists confirmed the previously known two interrogations for Wallenberg’s long-term cellmate Willy Rödel on July 22, 1947. However, surprisingly they also stated that an unidentified “Prisoner no. 7” had been part of the special interrogation line-up of prisoners on July 23, 1947 who had direct connection with the Wallenberg Case and who were all questioned during that fateful night.

In fact, it was Russian officials who came to the conclusion that “Prisoner no. 7” “in great likelihood” is identical with Raoul Wallenberg. They based their statements on circumstantial evidence, especially the fact that both “Prisoner no. 7” and Willy Rödel were questioned on July 22, 1947, thereby excluding the

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6. As Gennady Kuzovkin, a researcher at the International “Memorial” Society (Moscow), who conducted a short study for the Swedish Working Group, put it, “the [whole] research could have been done more carefully and based on much wider circle of sources.” See “Raoul Wallenberg’s fate: There are still no clear answers to the questions” (in Russian). Radio Freedom. January 12, 2001, http://archive.svoboda.org/archive/hr/0101/ll.011201-1.asp.
7. Archival documents about this interrogation were discovered in 1991 by Arseny Roginsky (currently, Chairman of the International “Memorial” Society, Moscow) and Dr. Vadim Birstein in what was then the Special Archive in Moscow (now the Russian State Military Archive or RGVA). At the time, both were members of the first International Commission to Establish the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg; the Commission was formed and headed by Dr. Guy von Dardel. For the first time, this interrogation and its circumstances were discussed in: Vadim Birstein, “The Secret of Cell Number Seven: Did an ‘Extremely Important Prisoner,’ Raoul Wallenberg, Die from a Natural Cause?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Independent Newspaper], April 25, 1991, p. 4 (in Russian). The English translation is available at http://www.vbirstein.com; and Vadim Birstein. Interrogations in Lubyanka. Novoe Vremya [New Times]. 1993. No. 1. Pp. 40-44 (in Russian); the English translation is available at the same site.
8. The transfer of Wallenberg and Rödel from Lefortovo Prison to Cell no. 7 in Lubyanka Prison was discussed for the first time on the basis of a newly discovered in April 1991 archival document signed by Colonel Sergei Kartashov, head of the 4th Department of the 3rd MGB Main Directorate (military counterintelligence), in: Birstein. “The Secret of Cell Number Seven.” Before this transfer, Rödel and Raoul Wallenberg were imprisoned together for nearly two years in Lefortovo Prison (1945-47).
possibility that “Prisoner no. 7” could be identical with Rödel.\textsuperscript{9} If confirmed, this finding would constitute proof that Raoul Wallenberg was alive six days after the official Soviet claim of his death on July 17, 1947 in Lubyanka Prison.

FSB officials released only a censored copy of the Lubyanka interrogation registers for 22 and 23 July 1947, showing the names of just two prisoners: Langfelder and Sandor Katona, a Hungarian citizen arrested in September 1944 in Sofia. Katona appears to have been Langfelder’s cellmate.

Requests for clarification and further information about “Prisoner no. 7” have so far remained unanswered. Two letters written by the Swedish Ambassador Tomas Bertelman to the FSB archives from December 2009 and March 2011 have also received no response.

The FSB archivists’ refusal to present an uncensored copy of the relevant pages of the Lubyanka Prison Interrogation Register which shows the actual entry for "Prisoner no. 7", or to allow researchers access to the original documentation, raises questions about what details in this entry Russian officials may wish to conceal.

Interestingly, in the early 1990s, Ambassador Hans Magnusson, former Chairman of the Swedish side of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, was allowed to inspect the Lubyanka Prison Interrogation Registers for the years 1945-1949. At the time, he apparently did not notice any records for a “Prisoner no. 7” on July 22-23, 1947. Whether any records for a “Prisoner no. 7” on that day were, in fact, overlooked has been difficult to establish as no full copy of the relevant page has been released. When in 2012

\textsuperscript{9} “Prisoner no. 7” may have been a reference to a prisoner held in Cell no. 7 of Lubyanka Prison in 1947. It was a common NKVD/NKGB/MGB practice to conceal for some time the prisoner’s identity during investigation. In February 1947, Colonel Kartashov ordered both Raoul Wallenberg and Willy Rödel to be placed in Cell no. 7 of Lubyanka Prison.
Ambassador Magnusson asked the FSB officials to show him the register again, as part of a new official review of the Wallenberg case he was then conducting for the Swedish Foreign Ministry, his request was denied.10

What do FSB archivist wish to hide? Certain notations on the page? Names of other, still unknown prisoners held in Lubyanka Prison in 1947? The name of the interrogator for “Prisoner No. 7”?

A copy of the uncensored July 22-23, 1947 entries from the Lubyanka Interrogation Register, showing interrogations of a “Prisoner no. 7” together with Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona, should have been included in the set of documents that were released by the KGB back in 1991.

If the failure of Russian archivists in 1991 to share the information about “Prisoner no. 7” had simply been an inadvertent oversight, there would have been plenty of opportunities over the next ten years to correct the mistake. Yet the Russian side never indicated to researchers that they possessed this information.

The issue attains an additional significance due to the facts stated by Boris Solovov, a former investigator of the 2nd GUKR SMERSH Department and then of the 4th Department of the MGB 3rd Main Directorate (military counterintelligence), that investigated the Raoul Wallenberg case, in his interviews with the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991-92.11 He testified that some time in or shortly after 1947 he had been given a parcel that should be delivered to the MGB archive section. This parcel had carried the label “Contains material related to Prisoner no. 7.” Solovov stated that he knew explicitly at the time that the term “Prisoner no. 7” referred to Raoul Wallenberg.12

In the same interviews Solovov also stated that Nikolai Kuleshov, an official of the 3rd Main Directorate, created a special diagram of all prisoners who had had direct contact with Raoul Wallenberg since 1945.13 These prisoners were subsequently isolated. Unfortunately, Solovov did not identify the year when this event presumably happened.

Apparently, Solovov was mistaken about Kuleshov’s involvement. Before May 1946, Kuleshov headed a section within the 4th GUKR SMERSH Department, and later, from May 1946 to January 1948, he served

10. Ambassador Hans Magnusson’s request was initially granted in 2012. However, already later that same day, permission to see the records was retracted, with no explanation (Hans Magnusson’s personal communication).
11. At first Boris Solovov was identified as one of the investigators of prisoners related to the Wallenberg Case, -- his name appeared in the documents studied by researchers Roginsky and Birstein in 1990-91 in the Special Archive (Moscow). After this, on Dr. Guy von Dardel’s request Dr. Birstein called Solovov on the phone, but he refused to talk about the Wallenberg Case without a permission from KGB officials.
13. On the structure of the GUKR (Military Counterintelligence Main Directorate) SMERSH and activity of its departments, including the 2nd Department headed by Col. Sergei Kartashov, and reorganizations of the GUKR SMERSH after WWII, see Birstein. SMERSH, Stalin’s Secret Weapon. Pp. 177-216, 323-327. Additionally, the book contains information about Solovov’s biography (pp. 325-326, 381-383, 403-404).
as Deputy Head of the 6th Department (investigation of Soviet servicemen charged mostly with treason and espionage) of the 3rd Main Directorate that had no connection to Kartashov’s department in charge of the Wallenberg case investigation. However, the alleged creation by investigators of charts of the movements of prisoners through prison cells is quite possible and this question should be clarified.

Researchers have repeatedly requested a copy of the full page, as well as uncensored copies of all prison register pages from Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons mentioning Wallenberg and Langfelder, and especially “Prisoner no. 7.” These requests have not been met. In response to this failure, we have asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry to take up this issue in an official way with Russian authorities. So far, no formal answer to these inquiries has been received.

Another “Prisoner no. 7” who is noted in the Lubyanka Prison Interrogation Register in April 1945, was identified in 2001 by Colonel Vladimir Vinogradov, member of the FSB administration and a member of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, as "a Russian citizen." This “Prisoner no. 7” was called to an interrogation on the same day as Wallenberg and therefore, clearly could not be identical with him. Col. Vinogradov indicated to Ambassador Magnusson that he had identified this particular "Prisoner no. 7" with the help of unspecified “perepiska” (internal correspondence). Col. Vinogradov showed Ambassador Magnusson a copy of the “perepiska”, but did not provide a copy of the document/s in question.

A few years later, FSB archivists claimed that the identification of that prisoner was made on the basis of entries in the Lubyanka Prison Interrogation Register. This is not possible, since the registers contain no information about a prisoner’s citizenship. Researchers are still waiting to learn how Col. Vinogradov identified the name and citizenship of that prisoner and if this methodology can be applied also to the “Prisoner no. 7” from 1947.

Our request for a disclosure of the procedure of providing a MGB prisoner under investigation with a number and how such a prisoner was tracked remains unanswered. It is unclear if the FSB still possesses old instructions for an investigation process. However, in 1991, when the Swedish-Russian Working Group started its activity, a lot of old SMERSH/MGB investigators (Daniil Kopelyansky, Boris Solovov, Pavel Grishaev, Nikolai Mesyatsev among others) were still alive and, possibly, could have provided such information.

One more Russian person is known to have been assigned no. 7 while he was under MGB investigation. This was the famous surgeon, Academician Sergei Yudin, arrested on December 23, 1948. The FSB archivists should provide information from his 5-volume Archival-Investigation File or Personal File on how S. S. Yudin, while having been under investigation, was given no. 7 instead of his name.

14. In the 1990s-2000s, Col. V. K. Vinogradov was deputy head of the FSB Directorate of Registration and Archival Collections or URAF.
In May 2012, the FSB archivists stated that “there is no way for confirming or denying the fact that Wallenberg was a so-called ‘numbered prisoner’, i.e., ‘Prisoner no. 7’, on the basis of documents.”

Apparently, the Lubyanka Prison administrators must have had special registers and other documentation to track numbered prisoners. From the numerous memoirs of former prisoners, it is also known that in Lubyanka Prison guards called numbered prisoners from their cells for interrogations by the numbers, and not names, although the guards belonged to the MGB Prison Department, and not to the investigation department in charge of prisoners.16

Due to these facts, a number of questions arise:

What were the administrative procedures to assign numbers to prisoners under investigation in Lubyanka Prison during the 1947-51 years? How were these numbered prisoners traced? Where are special registers or other documentation that allowed prison personnel to track these prisoners?

The FSB has never answered any of these questions.

It also needs to be determined if the Raoul Wallenberg Case always remained with the 4th Department of the MGB 3rd Main Directorate. From the materials released by the Russian Foreign Ministry from its archive (AVP RF) it is known that in February 1947 Pyotr Fedotov, at the time head of the 1st MGB Main Directorate (foreign intelligence), as well as deputy State Security Minister in charge of intelligence (i.e., one of Minister Abakumov’s deputies), informed the Soviet Foreign Ministry that Raoul Wallenberg was in the MGB custody.

The involvement of Fedotov points to the possibility that at the time Wallenberg was “on loan” to Foreign Intelligence from the 3rd MGB Main Directorate headed by Nikolai Selivanovsky, another Abakumov’s deputy, but in charge of counterintelligence. During meetings of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, SVR representatives (SVR is the successor of the former 1st First MGB/KGB Main Directorate) claimed that the SVR Archive does not contain any material relevant to the Raoul Wallenberg case.

Obviously, the question of a possible involvement of Soviet Foreign Intelligence in the Raoul Wallenberg case in February 1947 should be clarified and materials in the SVR Archive should be studied by independent researchers.17

16. During the 1946-53 period, MGB and MVD had separate administrations of prisons. In the MGB, it was the Prison Department that was responsible for MGB investigation prisons and from October 1949 on, of three special prisons in the cities of Vladimir, Aleksandrovsk and Verkhne-Uralsk. At the same time, from 1941 to 1953, there was the NKVD/MVD Prison Directorate (a directorate is a much bigger administration unit then a department) in charge of all NKVD/MVD prisons and camps. See Kokurin A. I. and N. V. Petrov. Lubyanka: Organs of the VCheKa—OGPU—NKVD—NKGB—MGB—MVD—KGB, 1917-1991. Reference Book. Moscow: Demokratiya, 2003. Pp. 235-236 (in Russian).

17. It should be noted that some cases of prisoners who had direct connection with Raoul Wallenberg, like those of Charles (Karl) Schandl and Gerrit van der Waals, were transferred to the 2nd MGB Main Directorate (interior counterintelligence) as early as mid-1946. While there is currently no indication, it needs to be fully determined if Raoul Wallenberg’s case was ever transferred to this or any other MGB Directorate after July 1947.
According to a memoir published in 1999 by Valery Boldin, a close aide to the former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (from 1981 to 1987, he was Gorbachev’s assistant, and in 1990-1991, he headed Gorbachev’s Office), the interrogation protocols for Raoul Wallenberg were preserved well into the 1950s and were found in Stalin’s personal safe after his death in 1953. It remains unknown on what information did Boldin base this claim and what has happened to the records.

During the early 1990s, a specially created group comprised of Swedish and Russian representatives interviewed numerous former employees of the Soviet Security Services. Many of the interview protocols remain classified by both the Swedish and Russian sides. Independent researchers should be allowed to review them.

2) The Mystery of the Word “Prashel/Proshel”

The released censored page from the Lubyanka Interrogation Register contains a strange detail. Instead of personal signatures of prisoners that, according to the rules, should have appeared in the last column, one can see what looks like a Russian signature “Prashin”, or a Russian word with a capital letter “P” that could be interpreted with some imagination as “Prashel,” which has no meaning. The FSB archivists insist that the word is “Proshel”, meaning “Went through/came through”, ignoring the fact that the third letter in the handwritten word is clearly “a” and not “o”, as it should be in the word “Proshel.” If this is true, it means that the prison guard who wrote this note was illiterate. They also refused to show the original or to make a copy of the whole page. Our request to provide us with copies of other examples of records with the same word “Proshel” to illustrate that such a form of registration existed has been rejected so far.

Fig. 2. The note "Proshel" in interrogation register of Lubyanka Prison, July 23, 1947.

The FSB archivists seem to have overlooked the fact that during the 1990s they had released a document with the entry "Proshel", regarding another “Prisoner no. 7” held in Lubyanka in 1945.


19 Susanne Berger received permission to study some of the summaries of these interviews in the archives of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the documentation has not been released to the public and is not included in the official database of the Raoul Wallenberg case established by the Swedish Foreign Ministry archives. The interview protocols remain classified in Russian archives.
FSB archivists confirmed that the entry for “Prisoner no. 7” for July 23, 1947 is also signed the same way, but did not provide a copy of the entry. It remains unknown if on this day the word under discussion was written in the same handwriting and with the same “a” instead of “o”.

If the word is, in fact, “Proshel” (“went through”), it apparently indicates that the prisoners at this time were still alive. According to the restored entry in the Lubyanka Prison Register of Prisoner Possessions (this Register contains records of the items that prisoners were not allowed to have in their prison cells), that had been blacked out at some point by the KGB, Langfelder’s personal possessions were given out from a storage on July 24, 1947. This was the next day after the July 23, 1947 interrogation, which suggests that Langfelder was about to leave Lubyanka Prison. But from the Russian phrasing “on the order of Com.[rade] Finogenov [deputy chief warden of Lubyanka Prison] all the belongings were given out [vydany na ruki]” it is not clear if it was Langfelder who received the possessions, while the signature of the person who signed the note suspiciously resembles the word “Prash…” that the FSB archivists claim to be “Proshel.”

From another document, a copy of the list of Langfelder’s possessions made in Lefortovo Prison, it is clear that the possessions were given not to a prisoner, but to the accompanying guard. The copy shows a note written by the guard: “[I] picked up all the possessions. 23.07.47. [Signature].” The FSB archivists interpreted the signature as the name “Maznev.” In other words, before Langfelder was moved in the early morning of July 23, 1947, from Lefortovo to Lubyanka, his possessions were picked up by a guard and then registered in the possession register in Lubyanka. From this storage, the possessions were taken the next day, and now the signature was “Prash. . .”

Therefore, if the signature in the register of possessions in Lubyanka Prison is identical to the word after the records of last interrogations, the scenario of events may have been somewhat different from the interpretation presented by FSB archivists. It is unclear how the same MGB officer signed all these papers.

Obviously, until the FSB presents examples of the word “Prashel/Proshel” in the records of interrogations of other prisoners, as well as shows the original pages with these records, especially for “Prisoner no. 7,” the interpretation of this word in the respective records remains unclear.

3) The Censoring of Records and Russian Secrecy and Privacy Laws

In the reply from May 2012, the FSB stated that the release of copies of pages from the register, “where in the column ‘signing of the arrestee after coming from an interrogation’ there is a note ‘proshel’ for third persons is not stipulated by the Russian legislation.” Regrettably, the archivists did not clarify this phrase and what law they are referring to. This answer closes an opportunity to independently inspect and verify FSB information about the lists of the arrestees interrogated during both nights of July 22 and 23, 1947, which is of central importance for the Wallenberg Case.

Our repeated requests to make uncensored copies of the records also for the previous evening, July 22, 1947 in both prisons, Lefortovo and Lubyanka and to show us original records were denied.
So far it remains unclear from where FSB officials obtained the information about “Prisoner no. 7” and his interrogations on July 22 and 23, 1947 in Lubyanka Prison. Russian privacy law should not be applied to the entry of “Prisoner no. 7” since providing a copy of the entry does not automatically disclose the identity of the prisoner in question.

The release of this crucial piece of information about “Prisoner no. 7” — whether contained in the Lubyanka Prison register or in another source — nearly twenty years after the Swedish-Russian Working Group began its official work raises serious questions. It suggests that Russian officials chose to intentionally withhold this detail from the Swedish members of the Working Group (with the possible exception of Hans Magnusson), researchers and the public in 1991. The reasons for this decision need to be examined further.

If “Prisoner no. 7” is indeed listed on the page for July 23, 1947, it emphasizes the fact that Russian censorship of records is not innocuous or designed primarily to protect arcane secrecy/privacy rules, but instead serves to prevent investigators to learn key facts in the Wallenberg Case. By implication, all other censorship researchers have encountered during and after the work of the Working Group must be viewed and reexamined in this light.

It also raises important questions about the letter written by Minister of State Security (MGB) Viktor Abakumov to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on July 17, 1947, the content of which has never been released. Researchers now have to wonder whether the letter is truly missing or has been intentionally withheld because its contents do not reflect the official version provided by Soviet and Russian authorities about what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, namely that he died on July 17, 1947. If he was alive six days later, Abakumov could not have reported Raoul Wallenberg’s death on July 17, 1947.

A similar problem arises with the letter of a man called Shiryagin from the city of Kharkov (Ukraine) who wrote to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) in 1956. In the letter Shiryagin stated that he had important information about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Mikhail Gribanov, at the time head of the 3rd (Scandinavian) Department of MID, forwarded the letter to the KGB officials with a request to ensure that Shiryagin stop talking about Wallenberg, so that Swedish officials would not hear about the matter. The Swedish-Russian Working Group tried hard to locate both Shiryagin and his letter but was unsuccessful.

The question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains currently unsolved. He may have been murdered in July 1947 or shortly afterwards. However, there is still the possibility that he could have remained under investigation for some time in MGB investigation prisons in Moscow. It also is possible that he was eventually sentenced and sent away from Moscow. Unhindered access to Moscow prison

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20. From 1943 to 1946, V. S. Abakumov (1908-1954) headed the Main Directorate SMERSH (military counterintelligence) of the Defense Commissariat/Ministry (Abakumov reported directly to Josef Stalin, Defense Commissar), and from 1946 to 1951, he was State Security (MGB) Minister. See details in: Birstein. *SMERSH, Stalin’s Secret Weapon*.
registers of arrivals and departures of prisoners by independent researchers is necessary to answer these essential questions.

4) Additional Information That Requires Clarification

a. The 2001 report of the Russian part of the Working Group (available at http://www.regeringen.se) contains a statement by the former KGB official Col. Andrei Bachurin, deputy head of the KGB Press Bureau in the early 1970s. At some point — apparently around 1956, the time of the preparation of the Andrei Gromyko Memorandum of 1957, — Bachurin was involved in writing a KGB reply to one of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s inquiries about the cause of Wallenberg’s death.

Bachurin claimed that “the [KGB] leadership at the time did not want to tell the real cause of death of the Swedish diplomat.” This statement implies that the KGB at the time had knowledge of Wallenberg’s death, as well as how he died.

However, the comment needs to be checked further. In what context and to whom was this statement made? Did Bachurin have full knowledge of the Raoul Wallenberg case? Did Bachurin’s KGB colleagues reveal how Wallenberg died and when? And if so, is this knowledge persevered today?

b. Beginning in 1991, the KGB (later the FSB) Central Archive released a series of copies of records from the Interrogation Registers of both Lubyanka (also known as Inner Prison) and Lefortovo Prisons, on the interrogations of Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder, from 1945 to 1947. However, the record of the last known interrogation of Wallenberg on, as the KGB/FSB indicated it, March 11, 1947, should be confirmed.

According to the released copy of the page from the Interrogation Register of Lubyanka Prison (without a date), there is also a record of an interrogation of the arrested Soviet Academician Vasily Parin (no. 36). But documents in Parin’s Archival-Investigation File do not confirm the date of March 11, 1947, given by the FSB archivists, since there were interrogations on March 3, 7, and 24. Wallenberg’s record


22. Document A31, the Raoul Wallenberg database, website of the Swedish Foreign Ministry http://www.regeringen.se. Secretary of the USSR Medical Academy V. V. Parin (1903-1971) was arrested on February 17, 1947. In April 1948, the MGB Special Board (OSO) sentenced him to a 25-year imprisonment; he was kept in Vladimir Prison. After Stalin’s death, in October 1953, Professor Parin was released and continued his scientific career.

23. In the Soviet system, two files were opened for each arrested person: Personal File (usually at first called Prison File), and Investigation File. The first file contained documents regarding the arrest of a prisoner and his/her life in investigation prisons, and, after conviction, — in the labor camp or prison. If the prisoner died during incarceration in prison or camp, his/her Personal File remained in the archive of the place of his/her detention. If the prisoner was released after the end of his/her term, according to law his/her Personal File should have been destroyed after five years of storage; this did not always happen, and some personal files survived in the archives. Currently, personal files of most of the foreigners arrested in the 1940s-50s are kept in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) in Moscow. Investigation files contained mostly documents concerning investigation of a person accused of political crimes. After conviction, they were filed in the
on the released copy has the number 33, and, therefore, the date of that interrogation should have been written in the register approximately two pages before this page. Despite several requests, the FSB has not provided a copy of a page with the date of this Wallenberg’s interrogation.

2. Medical Records

During a press conference in January 2001, Col. Vinogradov cited a reference to a medical registry that supposedly showed that Raoul Wallenberg had asked for medical assistance once, when he requested an appointment with a dentist. The actual register entry has never been presented by the FSB despite numerous inquiries. Russian officials stated that the information had been provided by the above-mentioned KGB official Bachurin.

During an interview by the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1993, Col. Bachurin indicated that Wallenberg's request occurred "either in Butyrka or Lefortovo." The FSB informed researchers that medical registers are not available in its archives for Butyrka Prison (the records exist only after 1947), as well as for Sukhanovo Prison (the third MGB investigation prison in Moscow) and for Vladimir Prison (one of three special prisons for keeping the most important sentenced political prisoners). In 1949 Butyrka Prison became one of Moscow MGB investigation prisons (previously it belonged to the Interior Ministry, MVD), and there is no indication that Wallenberg was ever kept in that prison. According to the FSB, medical records also did not survive for Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons. Col. Bachurin died in 2004. Obviously, the issue of medical registers of MGB prisons remains an open question, as does the question about how Col. Bachurin learned of Raoul Wallenberg’s request.

3. Questions about the OSO (MGB Special Board) Lists of Names and Lubyanka Prison Death Register

Since 2001, researchers have filed numerous requests regarding prisoners sentenced by the MGB Special Board (OSO) – the special MGB “court” that “tried” most of the persons arrested and investigated by the MGB.24 The FSB has repeatedly answered that neither Raoul Wallenberg, nor Vilmos Langfelder were formally charged or sentenced for any crime and that they are not listed in the materials of the OSO. However, this information requires verification by independent researchers.

The FSB has consistently denied access to the OSO original materials referring to the state secrecy restrictions. Our requests to release copies of the lists of prisoners sentenced by OSO for specific years were also rejected.25

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24. The OSO MGB was created on November 2, 1946 for trying cases investigated in the MGB. See Kokurin and Petrov. Lubyanka: Organs of the VCheka—OGPU—NKVD—NKGB—MGB—MVD—KGB. P. 141 (in Russian).
25. Currently, the OSO MGB materials are kept not in the FSB Central Archive in Moscow, but, apparently, in its local branch, --the Archive of the Omsk Region FSB Directorate, in the city of Omsk, Siberia. Still, it should be possible to make reasonable arrangements to obtain the requested information.
FSB archivists told Susan E. Mesinai, an official consultant to the Swedish part of the Working Group, that the names of Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder do not appear in the official annual records for 1947 or 1948 in the Lubyanka Prison Death Register.

However, no independent expert was allowed to study the original documentation, including the Death Registers, for Lubyanka Prison or other investigation prisons located in Moscow, such as Lefortovo and Butyrka for specific years.\(^{26}\)

### 4. Raoul Wallenberg’s Personal Possessions

One of the main unsolved issues in the Wallenberg investigation is the allegedly accidental discovery of Wallenberg’s valuables, money and other possessions by KGB officials in 1989, which supposedly occurred without the help of any archival finding aids. The timing of the discovery -- September 1989, just about a month before Wallenberg's family visited Moscow on the invitation of Mikhail Gorbachev, then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and later, Soviet President -- also appears questionable. Soviet officials claimed that they had been discovered during refurbishment of old KGB offices.

Raoul Wallenberg’s personal possessions included his appointment diary, valuables and large sums of foreign currency in old bills. Many questions persist about this alleged discovery that have never been answered.

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It is known that the system of recording possessions was quite elaborate, with giving the prisoner separate receipts for the money and for the other valuables. How could such items be found without corresponding archival documentation?

It would be extremely unusual if Wallenberg’s appointment diary had been kept along with the valuables. Usually such documentation was part of the materials in the Archival-Investigation File. Therefore, the origin of these two items remains a mystery.

The Soviet and Russian authorities claimed that Wallenberg died in July 1947. During investigation, valuables and currency were stored in the NKGB/MGB Financial Department. In most cases of political arrestees, the sentencing of a prisoner included confiscation of valuables and currency. But if a prisoner died, under prison rules theoretically the currency and valuables should have been permanently confiscated by the Soviet State within six months of his/her death or returned to next-of-kin. These rules did not apply to prisoners under investigation in NKVD/NKGB/MGB prisons: from July 1939 on, it was forbidden to inform relatives about the death of their loved ones who had been under investigation and to release corpses of these prisoners to the relatives.

However, since Wallenberg was listed a prisoner-of-war (POW), as it is written on his Prisoner Card in Lubyanka Prison which was released in 1989 along with his possessions, apparently the rules for POWs had been applied to him. According to these rules, after his death such valuables as his gold cigarette case should have been sent to the Precious Metals Directorate of the USSR Finances Ministry, and the foreign banknotes, — to the State Bank (Gosbank).

If Raoul Wallenberg indeed died in 1947, why then was his currency and valuables not confiscated and sent away according to the Soviet rules, but were still in the MGB/KGB storage and handed over to his family in 1989?

One more question is: How did Soviet authorities know what amount they should return? Did they indeed find a package or envelope containing bills of foreign currency or did they have a copy of the receipt that was given to Raoul Wallenberg on his arrival in Lubyanka Prison in 1945? If so, in which file did the KGB officials locate this receipt?

27. Even if the sentencing did not include confiscation, later the former prisoner received after his release not foreign currency bills, but an equivalent sum in Russian rubles.
28. The question of confiscation was discussed in: S. E. Mesinai. Ramification of Wallenberg’s Returned Possessions. The Swedish Report (2000). Appendix 44. Pp. 324-326. Ms. Mesinai based her discussion on the archival study by Gennady Kuzovkin, a researcher at the International “Memorial” Society in Moscow. Unfortunately, the archival reference information to the materials provided in the text is inaccurate and incomplete. Ms. Mesinai, who inspected Russian documents for the Swedish Working Group, studied archival files with the help of a Russian translator. So did the other consultant to the Group, Susanne Berger. It is unfortunate that the Swedish Working Group did not include a native Russian-speaking archivist-expert in Soviet history.
5. Last Documentary Record About Wallenberg’s Personal Possessions

The released records about Wallenberg’s possessions are also far from clear. In 1991, the KGB presented a censored copy of the left page of the blacked out entry (the records stretched over two pages — the left and right pages of the register) and a restored version of it [Appendix 18, p. 252 in the official Swedish report *Raoul Wallenberg* (Stockholm, 2000)]. However, no explanation was given why the KGB believed this record definitely referred to Wallenberg’s possessions (aside from the fact that the entry was censored and Wallenberg was allegedly transferred from Lefortovo Prison on March 1, 1947) since the name was not fully restored. Only two Russian letters, presumably first letters of Wallenberg’s name or his initials, — part of an assumed Russian capital letter “P” (“R”) (it could be also part of the Russian capital letter “B” — “W”) and, possibly, the Russian capital letter “Г” (“G”) — could be made legible and identified, as well as the date “2” of unknown month and year. Additionally, the copy does not include the right and left columns on the page, and, therefore, it is hard to interpret the record.

Contrary to what one can see in Appendix 18, the authors of the Swedish report wrote (p. 136): “The note concerning Raoul Wallenberg was blotted out but has been restored. It listed those of his belongings which went with him when he was transferred from Lefortovo to Lubyanka in February-March 1947.” There is nothing of the sort in the KGB reconstruction presented in Appendix 18. The actual name of belongings and a description of their content, — these should be two different receipts with different numbers written in this column (and clearly, these two were blotted in the document), — could not be restored, since the blotting made with a pen was too severe.

A copy of the right page was presented later in full (Appendix 47, p. 329 in the Swedish report), which gives a little bit more information. The record in the first column says that the papers for belongings (and, apparently, the belongings) arrived from Lefortovo Prison. The next column has a signature of the storage keeper who registered the possessions in Lubyanka. But there is no other record written in words on the line in the next columns. The authors of the Swedish report commented this in the following way (p. 136): “No mention of what happened to them [possessions] later on. *This space was left empty* [the emphasis is in original], which is unique. The ledger indicates what happened later on to the belongings of all the other prisoners listed here [in the report].”

In order to draw this strong conclusion about the uniqueness of the record regarding Wallenberg, one needs to see many original records in the register. The record was shown to Ambassador Hans Magnusson as Chairman of the Swedish group, but it is, obviously, not enough for a serious study and conclusion. Additionally, this statement is not completely correct because we do not know what happened to Katona’s possessions and if and how they were registered.

However, instead of words, there is a check mark in the third column entitled “When the Possessions Were Given to the Gosfond [State Fund, i.e., confiscated] or to the Owner” that obviously has an important meaning. This check mark could be interpreted as that the possessions, in fact, were confiscated after Wallenberg’s death.

The requests to the FSB Central Archive to present copies of records of possessions of prisoners who died in Lubyanka Prison or were held in Lubyanka and died in the Hospital of Butyrka Prison (for
instance, Count István Bethlen, the former Prime Minister of Hungary, 1921-1941), remained without an answer.

Clearly, the FSB archivists need to clarify how and on what basis they came to the definite conclusion that the record they copied and presented for a review was, in fact, the record for Raoul Wallenberg’s possessions.

6. Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona’s Possessions

There are also questions about a copy of a receipt for and a list of Vilmos Langfelder’s possessions, as well as a list of Sandor Katona’s possessions. The FSB archivists have never clearly explained what type of file the copies of these documents came from (they have almost sequential page numbers, 151 for Katona and 154-155 for Langfelder) and why there was no similar documents for Wallenberg or Rödel.

This issue might have been clarified if the FSB showed independent researchers the original file with Langfelder and Katona’s receipts.

7. Prisoner Registration Cards

1) The Prisoner Card for Willy Rödel includes several entries on the back, indicating his transfer to Lubyanka Prison in late February 1947, his death in October 1947, as well as registration numbers for two receipts for his possessions, — his belongings and a list of items in them. No such information exists on Raoul Wallenberg's Prisoner Card. The question is: Why are the records on the cards so different?

2) Prisoner cards from both prisons, Lubyanka and Lefortovo, for prisoners directly connected with the Wallenberg case (especially Gustav Richter, Willi Scheuer-Schluter, Jan Lloyd, Ernst Huber, Paul-Erhard Hille, Ero Pelkonen, Horst Kitchmann, Reiner Stahel, Ernst Krafft, Otto Hatz, Hermann Thomsen-Krisko) should be provided by the FSB Central Archive for a review and analysis, to determine what information was noted on these documents, as a matter of routine administrative procedure.

3) No prisoner registration card has ever been presented for Vilmos Langfelder and Sandor Katona. This gap in the documentation should be examined further.

8. The Smoltsov Report and the Gromyko Memorandum

The most suspicious aspect of the so-called "Smoltsov Report" is that, almost miraculously, one document appears to answer all core questions in the Wallenberg Case — when, where and how Wallenberg died, plus what happened to his body (the report was released in February 1957 as part of the so-called Andrei Gromyko Memorandum, about Raoul Wallenberg). At the time, Andrei Gromyko was Soviet Foreign Minister.

31. This question was first raised by the consultant of the Swedish Group Susan E. Mesinai.
32. A short discussion of these questions was given in: Vadim Birstein, “The Mystery of Raoul Wallenberg’s Death.” Evreiskie novosti [Jewish News]. No. 6 (July 2002), p. 6 (in Russian); the English translation with an additional note
This report, written by Dr. Aleksandr Smoltsov, head of the Medical Department of Lubyanka Prison, in 1947 and addressed to MGB Minister Viktor Abakumov, stated that “a prisoner Walenberg [one letter “l” in the original]” had died of “a heart attack” on July 17, 1947, in his cell in Lubyanka Prison.³³ An additional note on the report, written by a pencil, and not by a pen as the main text, said that Abakumov ordered to cremate the body without an autopsy. Conveniently, both of the main protagonists in the document — Abakumov and Smoltsov — were dead by the time the report was made public.

It remains unclear how Smoltsov could arrive at the diagnosis of the death of “a heart attack” without conducting an autopsy. The order not to conduct an autopsy also makes no sense. First, it was against the usual prison routine. Second, if necessary, an autopsy report would have been written in a way that it would cover up the real cause of death if, for instance, Wallenberg was poisoned.

Generally speaking, both the addressee and person who wrote the report were unusual. According to a NKVD instruction dated 1939, for a prisoner, who died under investigation, “an autopsy report or a medical report on death” was issued in 3 copies, one of which was sent to the investigation department in charge of the prisoner, the second was sent to the NKVD Prison Department, and the third was put into the Personal File of the prisoner.³⁴

As far as it is known, the same bureaucratic procedure continued in the MGB investigation prisons. When Wallenberg’s cellmate Willy Rödel mysteriously died in October 1947 on the way from Lubyanka Prison to a POW Camp in Moscow suburbs (see the next part 9), the warden (nachal’nik) of Lubyanka Prison Aleksandr Mironov officially informed Col. Sergei Kartashov, head of the 4th Department of the 3rd MGB Main Directorate, -- the department that investigated Wallenberg and Rödel’s cases, -- about Rödel’s death and sent him a copy of an autopsy report. The same was in the case of the Dutch Lt. Gerrit van der Waals, who died in the Butyrka Prison Hospital on August 11, 1948 (see below). Assistant to the Head of Butyrka Prison Metal’nikov reported to the head of the 2nd MGB Main Directorate (interior counterintelligence) Evgenii Pitovranov, that was in charge of van der Waals’s investigation, about his death, and sent Pitovranov a copy of a medical report on his death.³⁵ In other words, in both cases Minister Abakumov was not involved.

Also, the warden of the prison was in charge of sending a corpse to the Moscow Crematorium. In Mironov’s report to Kartashov about the death of Rödel, there is a phrase: “At the same time I ask for

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³³ A misspelling of Wallenberg’s name occurred also in other prison documents. For instance, in the Lubyanka Prison Register of Interrogations on March 11, 1947 his name was written as “Woll’nberg.”
your urgent order to cremate the body.” Therefore, again, not Minister Abakumov, but the head of the 4th Department of the 3rd MGB Main Directorate gave an order about cremation.

There is no order about cremation in van der Waals’s Personal File, but there is a formal instruction addressed to the head of the crematorium: “A corps of a male is sent [to you] for cremation.” There are two signatures on the document: of the prison head Metal’nikov (he is mentioned here with this title) and Chief Doctor (apparently, of the Butyrka Prison Hospital) Finaev. In other words, if in case of Wallenberg the prison administration would have followed the rules, Smoltsov’s signature would have appeared on a similar document below the signature of Mironov. Surprisingly, the name of Lubyanka Prison warden Mironov was not mentioned in the Smoltsov Report at all.

The question of Mironov’s role acquires additional attention due to the claims contained in the recently published in Russian memoir of the former first KGB Chairman Ivan Serov. Serov had never worked in SMERSH or MGB, and had nothing to do with Wallenberg’s arrest and investigation from 1945-47. He always served in the NKVD/MVD and was one of Lavrentii Beria’s favorites, and in 1954, was appointed the first KGB Chairman. On the whole, Serov’s statements regarding Wallenberg are not supported by documents.

For instance, Serov claims that in 1954 in the «Wallenberg File» with «operational materials» there was a so-called Certificate (”Akt”) of Cremation for Raoul Wallenberg’s body, dated 1947 and signed by two officials of Lubyanka Prison, Chief Warden Aleksandr Mironov and Lubyanka’s Commandant (Chief Executioner) Vasily Blokhin. There is no evidence that such a file and a document existed. According to Serov, this file was kept in the Committee of Information, created in 1947. However, in 1954 this Committee was within the Foreign Affairs Ministry (MID) structure and did not have intelligence directorates. The MID Archive released its Wallenberg’s File, but it contains MID’s documents, and not «operational materials». And there is no evidence of existence of the «Akt», especially if one takes into consideration that, according his duties, Mironov did not sign this type of certificates, he could sign an order to send a body to the crematorium, and Blokhin made a mark or a note on the order to execute a particular prisoner, and not on the order about cremation; both Mironov and Blokhin were not present at the cremation.

Serov makes an additional statement that Blokhin was interrogated about the «liquidation» of Wallenberg. Supposedly Blokhin declared that he and his staff had no connection to the liquidation, at

36. Ibid. P. 87. After cremation, Metal’nikov sent a separate notification about the death of van der Waals to the head of the Department 2-A (fighting British spies) of the 2nd MGB Main Directorate, Fyodor Shubnyakov; this Department was directly in charge of investigation of the van der Waals case. Ibid. P. 88.
least he did not remember anything about that. Of course, there is a possibility that the case of Raoul Wallenberg was so special that Smoltsov followed Abakumov’s personal instructions the latter made in violation of prison rules, especially if Abakumov, in his turn, received directions from Stalin.

Fig. 4. The so-called Smoltsov Report, allegedly authored by Dr. Aleksandr Smoltsov. The document claimed that Raoul Wallenberg died on July 17, 1947 in Lubyanka Prison. The Soviet government announced the discovery of the report in 1957, but presented the actual document only in 1989. Two figures, “159” and “12”, written by a pencil at the top right corner of the document indicate that the report was once part of two archival files. One of the figures, “12”, was written by a blue pencil, similar to that one used for writing the additional note at the bottom.

In his memoir, General Serov also claims that Viktor Abakumov, who was himself arrested in July 1951, allegedly interrogated in 1953 or 1954 by Col. Aleksandr Kozyrev, then acting head of the MVD Department on Investigation of Especially Important Cases. In this interrogation, Abakumov presumably confirmed that Raoul Wallenberg, in fact, had been “liquidated” on direct orders of Stalin and Molotov. FSB Archivists have never presented a transcript of this interrogation.

The FSB Central Archive has never answered the question that has been pending for almost sixty years now: From what exact archival file did the Smoltsov Report originate?

During the 1990s, the original document, kept outside of its original file, was inspected by the Russian and Swedish forensic experts, as well as archivists of the Moscow International “Memorial” Society. All of them concluded that the document is almost certainly authentic, meaning that Dr. Smoltsov was its author. The main question with the report still is: Does it contain the truth about the time, place and

41 Ibid.
cause of death of Raoul Wallenberg? As almost all experts agree, the latter issue is particularly questionable.

The genesis and purpose of the Smoltsov Report remain unclear, as well as the exact circumstances in which the document was written. The main part of the report was written with purple ink, by a pen, but the additional note was written by a blue pencil. There is a possibility that Smoltsov may have written the note about cremation and autopsy at a later point, some time before his death in 1952. Or that the additional note was forged.42

Still, the possibility cannot be excluded that the document is a fake. In their follow-up report from 1992, the Swedish experts noted the discovery during the early 1990s of a large Soviet-era forgery lab, located on the premises of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, which contained large supplies of old stationery and different types of ink. The experts also pointed out that there were several persons available to the authorities "who were skilled in imitating other people's signatures and handwriting," especially among the former employees of Soviet security organs.43

However, if the report was forged, it was not the work of that laboratory – the document was provided by the KGB. The laboratory for making forged documents existed in Soviet security services from the 1920s, and within the MGB, it was called the Department “R”. In 1957, when the text of the Smoltsov Report was made publicly available, this was the 4th KGB Special Department.44

Unfortunately, Dr. Smoltsov’s handwriting samples that Russian and Swedish forensic experts used for their analysis did not include documents for 1947. However, the experts noticed that the writing speed of the text of Smoltsov’s Report was remarkably slower than that of the other sample documents.

The records regarding the employment of Aleksandr Smoltsov during the crucial summer of 1947, when he was, in fact, on medical leave from his post in prison, are of particular interest. This information has been requested by various researchers on numerous occasions, but there was no clear answer from the KGB/FSB.

One more question is whether Smoltsov was well enough to carry out his duties at Lubyanka Prison in July 1947, as claimed by Russian officials. For unexplained reasons, Russian authorities also did not provide forensic experts with any handwriting samples for Dr. Smoltsov from the year 1947.

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned details, it would be reasonable to submit the Smoltsov Report for an additional forensic testing by an independent group of experts.

42. The question about the authorship of the additional note written in pencil was first raised by the Russian journalist Vladimir Abarinov in 1991. The Swedish forensic experts who later examined the Smoltsov Report concluded that probably the additional note was also written by Smoltsov. A report in Swedish by Nils Ångström and Rolf Berzell, entitled “Slutrevisning av handstilsundersökningen av det s k Smoltsov-doukmentet,” dated January 8, 1992, p. 2.
43. Ibid.
Important questions also remain regarding the drafting of the Gromyko Memorandum in 1956-57. Why did the Soviet leadership not present more convincing evidence of Raoul Wallenberg's death? If the Smoltsov Report is genuine, why did the Politburo during internal deliberations consider several different versions of Wallenberg's death to be presented to the Swedish government? In one version, he was supposed to have died in Lefortovo Prison; another placed his death in Butyrka Prison.

Experts have various opinions on possible motivations of the Soviet leadership's decision-making process regarding the Smoltsov Report. Dr. Petrov has argued that since Soviet leaders had no intention of providing any information at all to Swedish officials about Raoul Wallenberg, one can conclude that the Smoltsov Report, as a strictly internal document, is genuine (while, of course, obscuring the true cause of Wallenberg's death). One can also surmise that during the 1950s, due to the increasing pressure from the Swedish government, Soviet leaders may have decided to create a document that would conveniently include all basic information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate and blaming the persons who had been deceased, -- especially Abakumov.

In light of the fact that the FSB archivists have stated that “Prisoner no. 7” was, probably, Wallenberg, who was interrogated five days after the date of his death according to the Smoltsov Report, it is hard to overestimate the necessity of information about the original file that contained the Smoltsov Report and the precise time of its discovery.

9. File PF-9653 and the File of Willy Rödel

For many years researchers have repeatedly asked the FSB Central Archive about the file of Wallenberg's longtime cellmate, Willy Rödel:

1) To show the original collection/file from which the few documents about Rödel that had been previously released supposedly originate. Russian officials indicated that this documentation is kept in a so-called "operative correspondence file" (PF-9653) that contains correspondence between prison officials and the 3rd MGB Main Directorate (military counterintelligence) about imprisoned foreign diplomats. The FSB would not allow researchers to inspect the original documents.

2) To inspect a few pages that were released to the Swedish side of the Working Group (medical documents regarding Rödel's death) as copies without page numbers. The archivists finally informed researchers about the page numbers, but never showed the originals.

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FSB archivists claimed for years that this file PF-9653 contained no further information about Rödel than that which had been previously released and that none of Rödel’s interrogation documents could be located.

In November 2009, the FSB officials suddenly informed two researchers (Birstein/Berger) that, in fact, some of Rödel’s interrogations did exist. Two of Rödel’s statements to his interrogators were published in Russian in 2011 in the book *Secrets of the Third Reich Diplomacy: German Diplomats, Leaders of Foreign Military Missions, Military and Police Attachés in Soviet Captivity. Documents from Investigation Files. 1944-1955*, edited by Lt. General Vasily Khristoforov (Moscow: Demokratiya Publ.), pp. 423-4 (in Russian). This seems to indicate that large parts of Willy Rödel’s file have indeed survived. It raises the important question whether similar documents have been preserved for other prisoners closely connected to the Wallenberg case, including Wallenberg himself.

Rödel’s file is especially significant because, as Nikita Petrov of the Moscow Memorial Society has discovered, it belongs to a group of files of the liquidated (secretly executed) persons. According to Col. Vinogradov, the same collection contains materials of the case of former Hungarian Prime Minister Count István Bethlen who died in the Butyrka Prison Hospital in 1946.

It is worth noting that the last page number in Rödel’s file is written on an envelope that contains, among other things, his prisoner card and diplomatic passport. This fact raises the question whether

46. Until November 2017, Lt. Gen. Vasily Stepanovich Khristoforov headed the FSB Directorate of Registration and Archival Collections (Управление регистрации и архивных фондов ФСБ РФ) or URAF; he succeeded Lt. Gen. Ya. F. Pogonii, who headed the URAF from 1992 to 1995, during the first years of the Swedish-Russian Group work. Some important materials about Wallenberg were released from the FSB Central Archive during Pogonii’s tenure. On November 27, 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed General Khristoforov from military service (see http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53344). However, Khristoforov continued heading Center for Publication of Sources on 20th Century Russian History at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (http://iriran.ru/?q=christoforov).

Raoul Wallenberg’s prisoner card and diplomatic passport released in 1989 were located in a similar collection of documents.

Rödel’s documents should be made available for review for a simple reason that Wallenberg’s longtime cellmate was executed (most probably, poisoned) on October 15, 1947, a few months after Wallenberg’s own trail breaks off in Lubyanka Prison. The documentation could provide important clues about how sensitive cases like his and that of Raoul Wallenberg were handled by the Soviet security apparatus at the time.

In 2012, the FSB published a compilation of documents entitled *SA Oberführer Willy Rödel: Documents from the FSB Archives of Russia*, edited by Lt. Gen. Khristoforov. The book includes documents from not only the file PF-9653, but also from another archival file (Fond 16. Opis’ 32 «Е». Delo 235). Previously, the latter had never been mentioned by FSB archivists. Furthermore, the publication of these documents does not replace the necessity of inspecting the originals.

A short review conducted in 1993 of a two-volume report of a special Commission headed by Nikolai Arzhannikov – who was deputy chair of the Committee on Human Rights at the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation – showed that Rödel’s file apparently included an important document in the Wallenberg case, a copy of the Vyshinsky Note dated August 18, 1947. This note stated that “Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and he is not known to us. It remains only to assume that Wallenberg was killed or captured by Hungarian Nazis.”

The FSB claims that the file PF-9653 (which contains Rödel’s file) does not include such a copy of the Vyshinsky Note. However, the review in 1992 suggests that this particular copy originated from some type of Rödel’s file. It carries Abakumov’s handwritten instruction “Comrade Kartashov should be acquainted with this.” Sergei Kartashov headed the MGB investigation department that conducted the investigation of both Wallenberg and Rödel’s cases from 1945-47.

The placement of a copy of the Vyshinsky Note (only 14 copies were typed originally for the highest Soviet leaders) in Rödel’s file in August 1947 would underscore the close link between his and Wallenberg’s case.

Willy Rödel died mysteriously on October 15, 1947. His autopsy report states that he suddenly died of a “heart paralysis” on the way from Lubyanka prison to the POW Krasnogorsk Prison Camp No. 27 in Moscow suburbs. However, according to a KGB archival document published by Nikita Petrov, Rödel was, in fact, “liquidated” (killed). This archival document reads: "Files of the Liquidated: Redel [the

49. Unfortunately, the copy of the Commission’s report that Dr. Birstein saw in 1992, was destroyed in the fire in the Russian Councils Building (“White House”) in 1993 that started after Russian tanks fired at this building. It is extremely important to check the other copies of the 2-volume materials of the Arzhannikov Commission if they exist.
50. An excerpt from the autopsy report for Willy Rödel; the autopsy was done on October 16, 1947. See documents nos. 41 and 42 in: SA Oberführer Willy Rödel. Pp. 72-74 (in Russian).
The last case concerns the secret poisoning of Theodor Romzha, Archbishop of the Ruthenian Catholic Eparchy of Mukachevo in October 1947 in Western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{52}

All these killings, as well as the killing of Isai Oggins that will be described in Part 15, were totally against Soviet law. These people were not sentenced to death by any court, and from May 1947 to January 1950, the death penalty was abolished in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{53} These victims were killed simply on orders of the Soviet leadership.

If to believe the published documents in the book \textit{SA Oberführer Willy Rödel}, documentation about cremation is missing in Rödel’s file. As already cited, there is a request of Lubyanka Prison warden Aleksandr Mironov to Sergei Kartashov, head of the 4th Department of the 3rd MGB Main Directorate to give “an urgent order to cremate the body.”\textsuperscript{54} The marking of the document is also unusual: “Highly Urgent.” Rödel died on October 16, 1947, the next day the autopsy was conducted, and on the same day, October 16, 1947, Mironov wrote his request about an urgency of cremation. Does this mean that

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{Fig_6_Willy_Roedel.jpg}
\caption{German diplomat Willy Rödel. Source: Rödel Family Archive}
\end{figure}
an autopsy report was totally falsified and the real condition of the body pointed to poisoning or other kind of killing?

The precise circumstances of Rödel's death still need to be determined.

10. Archival-Investigation Files and Operational Materials

1) Without examining the Archival-Investigation files of such prisoners as Hermann Grosheim-Krisko (Tomsen), who worked at the Swedish Legation in Budapest in 1944 and who was interrogated about Wallenberg many times, of the cellmates of Wallenberg and Langfelder like Gustav Richter, Horst Kitschmann, Franz Rudolf Gfrorener, and Sandor Katona, as well as known cell spies as Hans Loyda, Erhard Hille, and Walter Schlitter-Scheuer (Schlueter), the study of the Wallenberg case cannot be considered complete. These files are kept in the FSB Central Archive in Moscow.

During the 1990s, Ambassador Magnusson, as Chairman of the Swedish Working Group, was allowed to review some of the documentation. However, the FSB Central Archive has so far not allowed independent researchers to study these files in full. In the cases of Langfelder and Katona, FSB archivists claim that no records about them have survived at all, which is unlikely.

Although Willy Rödel’s son has provided notarized permission to researchers (Birstein and Berger) to study all archival materials of his father on his behalf, the FSB refused to grant access to these documents. It should be possible to arrive at some kind of arrangement to ensure that researchers can review operational files of prisoners placed with Wallenberg and Langfelder that might contain highly relevant information.

Here is one example to underscore this point: The KGB/FSB has never released a transcript of the interrogation of Hermann Grosheim-Krisko by Abram Waindorf, MGB investigator, on January 17, 1947, that, according to Grosheim himself, was only about Wallenberg. Supposedly, during that interrogation Waindorf wanted to know mostly about Wallenberg’s private life and background. It is possible that no transcript of this interrogation was put in Grosheim’s Archival-Investigation File, but this needs to be checked. This interrogation, in fact, took place — the date January 17, 1947 is on the FSB list of interrogations of Grosheim-Krisko (interrogator Waindorf, time 11:30-13:15). In general, Grosheim was very precise in his recollections.

FSB archivists for years have claimed that no Archival-Investigation files were created for Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder. This claim is almost certainly incorrect, since the failure to do so would have been contrary to regular administrative procedure. The discovery of the investigation material for Willy Rödel raises the question whether similar documentation may also have been preserved for Wallenberg and Langfelder. As mentioned earlier, certain items among Raoul Wallenberg’s possessions that were returned to his family in 1989 would have been originally kept in his Archival-Investigation file.
Nikita Petrov has suggested that a prisoner who was executed in the autumn of 1947 and who is known only by the pseudonym “Sluga” (“Servant”) may have been Vilmos Langfelder. FSB archivists deny that "Sluga" is identical with Langfelder without providing any proof to the contrary. FSB officials have also denied that "Sluga" may be a cover-name for the American prisoner Isai Oggins (see below Point 15), again without providing any evidence.

Petrov discovered, that the former KGB Chief Ivan Serov gave explicit orders to preserve Willy Rödel’s file, preventing its destruction. This underscores even more the need to determine if the prisoner known only as “Sluga” was Vilmos Langfelder and to check if any documentation about his case survives.

2) It is known that agent files (there was a special Agent File for each of informers in which his/her reports were kept) should be kept forever in the FSB Archives. Therefore, most likely agent files of all cell-spies who were placed with Wallenberg (Willi Scheuer-Schluter, Jan Loyda, Willy Rödel, and, apparently, Gustav Richter) survived and should be studied.

11. Transcripts of Interrogations or Debriefings of Raoul Wallenberg’s Colleagues

1) From January to April 1945, the members of the Swedish Legation, including the Swedish Envoy Ivan Danielsson, were detained by Soviet troops separately from Raoul Wallenberg. Later they were sent to Sweden via Moscow.

The FSB Central Archive released only a review of debriefings of this group of diplomats (a report by Yefim Mukhortov, deputy head of the SMERSH Directorate of the 2nd Ukrainian Front). The review points to previous statements of the members of the group.

Additionally, there were Danielsson’s discussions in March 1945 with Soviet General Ivan Pavlov’s headquarters (Pavlov commanded the NKVD Troops Guarding the Rear of the 3rd Ukrainian Front) which specifically dealt with the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest. It is important to determine what exactly Danielsson and the other Swedish representative told Soviet officials not only about the Legation’s activities in 1944 but also about the work of Raoul Wallenberg.

In June 1992, Col. Vinogradov told the Swedish-Russian Working Group that the Soviet foreign intelligence reports from Hungary for the years 1944 and 1945 were preserved in the archives of SMERSH (currently, the FSB Central Archive), "including those concerning the work of the Swedish Legation in Budapest."56

So far, researchers have not been able to study any of these files.

55 Documents of the headquarters of the NKVD Troops Guarding the Rear of various fronts are kept in the practically inaccessible Central Archive of the [Russian] Defense Ministry (TsA MO). The special Fond (Collection) 38652 at the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA) that contains materials of the secretariat of the NKVD Deputy Commissar in charge of NKVD troops and Fond 32880 at the same archive with materials of the Main Directorate of NKVD Troops Guarding the Rear should be also checked.

2) Since there was also correspondence between SMERSH headquarters in Moscow and the NKID about these detainees, the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (AVP RF, former MID’s archive) should be checked for this additional documentation. All the records found should be made accessible for researchers.

3) It remains unknown why Valdemar and Nina Langlet, the Swedish Red Cross representative in Budapest in 1944-45 and his wife, detained and questioned, like Wallenberg, were not ordered to be brought to Moscow. Basically, they did the same what Wallenberg did: they protected the Jews of Budapest. Dr. Langlet was negatively characterized in the above-mentioned Mukhortov’s SMERSH report to Moscow. Additionally, Count Mikhail Kutuzov-Tolstoy, an employee of the Swedish Legation in Budapest in 1944-45, claimed that during his 8-days detention at the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in 1945, his interrogators were very suspicious of Langlet.

Russian archivists have never released any documentation showing the official decision-making process about Nina and Valdemar Langlet, both of whom were at first kept with the detained Swiss diplomats Harald Feller and Max Meyer. The order by Nikolai Bulganin, Soviet Deputy Defense Commissar, to arrest and send Feller and Meyer to Moscow did not mention the Langlets. Evidently, there was a decision made in Moscow to release them. The documentation on the detaining and release of the Langlets, as well as transcripts of their interrogations, need to be released.

12. Materials of the MGB Department “A” (registration and archive) and Prison Department

1) The report of the Russian part of the Working Group states: “As the later [archival] studies showed, the MGB Department “A”, responsible for the registration of the arrestees, in response to inquiries from operational MGB departments provided them with information that the diplomat [Wallenberg] was kept in custody of military counterintelligence ‘Smersh.’” Only one note of the kind written by the MGB Department “A” has ever been released.

2) If Wallenberg, Langfelder and/or Katona survived after July 1947, were convicted and sent to a prison or a labor camp, there should be two types of archival records:

a) Records in the MGB Prison Department about issuing a “Naryad” (an order) for each of these prisoners for sending them to a particular prison or a labor camp;

b) Records in the same department about receiving a special registration card of the “Form 1” for each of these prisoners after they had reached the destination of their imprisonment.57

57. In this case there would be cards of these prisoners also in the MVD Central Prisoner Card File (in 1947-48, all labor camps and punishment prisons belonged to the MVD system). It was checked in 1990, during the work of the first Raoul Wallenberg International Commission. There were no cards of Wallenberg and Langfelder in that Central File (kartoteka). It is also possible that the cards were withdrawn before 1990, in an effort to hide Wallenberg and Langfelder’s presence in the Soviet prison system.
The FSB Central Archive has never stated that it specifically checked these two types of records for the period from the end of July 1947 (after the July 23, 1947 interrogation) until mid-1951, when former cellmates of Wallenberg and Langfelder had been sentenced and sent to Vladimir Prison.

3) In February-March 1948, following Stalin’s instruction and Decree of the Soviet government, the MVD started creating special labor camps and prisons for convicts under Article 58 of the Russian Criminal Code (the so-called political crimes). The same March 1948, special commissions in Moscow (Central Commission), Soviet republics and local regions, as well as in the centers of labor camps were organized to select those prisoners who would be transferred to the special prisons and camps. These commissions included high-level representatives of the MVD, MGB, and prosecutor offices. In the Central Commission, the MGB was represented by Deputy MGB Minister Afanasy Blinov, head of the MGB Department “A” Arkady Gertsovsky, and some others. The commissions considered cases of all convicts previously sentenced under Article 58.

If to suggest that Raoul Wallenberg and/or Vilmos Langfelder were convicted in 1947-first part of 1948, and were sent to a MVD punishment prison or labor camp, their cases were also evaluated by one of these commissions – most likely, by the Central Commission, – and the records about this evaluation should have been kept in the materials of the MGB Department “A”. Evidently, materials of the Central Commission should be checked for Wallenberg and/or Langfelder documents in the archival collection of the MGB Department “A” in the FSB Archive.

4) Apparently, documentation in the MGB Department “A” or Prison Department should also specify if prisoners under discussion were at that time registered under their own names or if they were assigned a number or, possibly, an alias name.

5) It also needs to be established if the MGB Prison Department received regular reports from the heads of MGB prisons with detailed information about the prisoner population for specific years, including a statistical breakdown of prisoners by nationality. Such statistics would provide important information about the presence of Swedish prisoners in specific prisons during specific years.

Independent researchers require free access to the archives of these two MGB departments and registers of the Moscow MGB investigation prisons in order to solve the question if Wallenberg’s name disappeared from the records because he was, apparently, murdered, or he remained under investigation, then was sentenced and sent out of Moscow.

6) Additionally, important questions remain about at least one unidentified Swedish prisoner or perhaps other foreign prisoners in Vladimir Prison after July 1947, whose identity Russian authorities have so far

58. The Central Commission included the following members: Vassily Ryasnoi, deputy MVD Minister; Afanasy Blinov, deputy MGB Minister; Georgy Dobrynin, head of the GULAG (MVD); Arkady Gertsovsky, head of the MGB Department “A” (operational registration, statistics, and archives); Boris Trofimov, deputy head of the GULAG and head of the 1st (Operational) Department of the GULAG; Vladimir Golovanov, head of the Department “2-L” (registration and information) of the 2nd MGB Main Directorate (interior counterintelligence); V. P. Diakonov, head of the Directorate for Supervision of Places of Detention of the General Prosecutor’s Office. See Nikita Petrov. The GULAG Empire History. Chapter 16 (in Russian), http://www.pseudology.org/GULAG/Glava16.htm.
failed to reveal. Several witness testimonies about Swedish prisoners, including "a Swedish diplomat," allegedly held in Butyrka Prison during the late 1940s and early 1950s, also require full clarification.59

7) At least in 1947, the MGB Prison Department had numerous correspondence with the Ivanovo MGB Directorate regarding the numbered Baltic prisoners who were kept in the investigation prison of the MGB branch (later, after conviction, these prisoners became numbered prisoners in Vladimir Prison). The archival materials of the MGB Prison Department need to be examined for this documentation.

Later the MGB Prison Department was in correspondence with Vladimir Prison regarding the numbered convicted prisoners.

Apparently, letters received by the Ivanovo MGB Directorate from Moscow regarding numbered prisoners later were transferred to the archive of Vladimir Prison. This archive and the Museum of Vladimir Prison History opened in prison in 1997 should be also checked for this correspondence.

13. Convicted Prisoners with Numbers in Vladimir Prison60

The question about the procedure of numbering particular convicted prisoners in Vladimir Prison (should not be confused with the numbering during an investigation) from 1947 to 1952 have been pending since 1990, when members of the first International Wallenberg Commission picked up prisoner cards with numbers in the archive of this prison. Before the inspection of the kartoteka (file of prisoner cards) at the Vladimir Prison Administrative Office in 1990, this form of concealing convicted political prisoners was not known even to historians.

In the 1970s-80s, a very small circle of political dissidents in Moscow knew about the existence of numbered prisoners in Vladimir Prison in the early 1950s due to the revelations by Boris Georgievich Menshagin.61 From 1951 to 1954, Menshagin was kept in Vladimir Prison as Prisoner no. 29, deprived of his name; on the whole, he spent more than 23 years in solitary confinement.62 Naturally, when the International Commission arrived in Vladimir in 1990, they presumed that if Raoul Wallenberg had ever been kept in Vladimir Prison, he might have been one of the numbered prisoners. In that prison, the numbered prisoners were officially called “osobyi kontingent” (“Special Contingent”).63
After selecting cards of numbered prisoners in the kartoteka in 1990, it became clear that before June 1948, when Prisoner no. 21 was brought in, there were only two numbered prisoners in Vladimir Prison, nos. 3 (Konstantin Ordzhonikidze, in Vladimir Prison from October 1944 till mid-1953), and 15 (Pietro Aladjani-Aladjanayn in Russian documents; imprisoned in Vladimir from August 1948 to January 1954).64

Apparently, until June 1948, there were no prisoners with the nos. 1-2, 4-14, and 16-20 in Vladimir Prison. Thus, a Vladimir Prison report dated November 1951 lists prisoners with the following numbers: 3, 15, 21-29.65 Therefore, as in 1948, at the end of 1951, the prisoners nos. 1-2, 4-14, and 16-20 were still missing. If there was a centralized NKGB/MGB system for numbering “special” convicts in 1944-48, prisoners with the “missing” numbers might have been kept in other NKVD/MVD prisons.66

In 1952, many of the “missing” numbers (nos. 1, 4-12) in Vladimir Prison were assigned to the just sentenced former Baltic officials and members of their families arrested in 1941.67 However, nos. 13, 14 and 16-20 were still missing – possibly, these prisoners were still kept elsewhere.68

The lack of the convicted prisoners nos. 1-2, 4-14, and 16-20 during the years 1944-1948 in Vladimir Prison could be explained in connection with the history of that prison.

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64. In English, Aladjani spelled his name as “Peter Alagiagian.” He was a Jesuit priest of Armenian origin and a chaplain in the Italian Army, in 1942 taken prisoner of war by the Soviets. Form December 1945, the 1st NKGB Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) investigated him for a while as an alleged British spy: from 1919 on, Aladjani was a Jesuit missionary in the Soviet Union, from where he was expelled in 1930; after this he stayed in Iran. After the 1st NKGB Directorate/MGB Main Directorate, the MGB Department for Investigation of Especially Important Cases continued investigating Aladjani’s case. On June 28, 1947, Aladjani was sentenced by the MGB Special Board (OSO) to 25-year imprisonment. According to his memoir, in a few days after his arrival, while he was staying with a cellmate, the order to keep him in solitary confinement as Prisoner no. 15 was announced to him and he was moved in another cell. See P. Alagiagian. My Prisons in Soviet Paradise. Toronto (Canada): Harpel’s Press Cooperative, 1969. Pp. 31-34.


67. Previously, from 1941 on, most of the Baltic and Estonians arrestees were kept in the NKGB/MGB investigation prisons of the Kirov, then Ivanovo regions, while the Lithuanians were sent to one of the Krasnoyarsk Region camps in Siberia. In October 1941, the Lithuanians were arrested and investigated by the local NKVD branch in the town of Kansk. After the completion of the investigation in 1942, materials were sent to the OSO NKVD in Moscow. However, only in 1952 all Baltic prisoners were convicted by the OSO MGB and sent to Vladimir Prison with assigned numbers. See documents nos. III-7, dated April 20, 1954, and III—16, dated June 1, 1954, in: Rehabilitation: How It Happened. Documents of the CC CPSS Presidium and other Materials. Vol. 1. March 1953-February 1956. Compiled by A. N. Artizov et al. Moscow: Demokratiya, 2000. Pp. 113-114, 153-154 (in Russian). Also, Alfonas Eidintas. President of Lithuania: Prisoner of GULAG: A Biography of Aleksadras Stulginkis. Vilnus: Genocide and Research Center, 2001.

68. Susan E. Mesina has suggested that the numbered prisoners 14, 16-20, who were apparently sentenced between June 1947 and May 1948 were held at Vladimir Prison. Swedish Working Group Report, 2000, pp. 157-158
Most likely, before 1948, the numbered prisoners were sent to various NKVD/MVD prisons (Vladimir Prison was one of the MVD prisons), and only from June 1948 on, the newly convicted numbered prisoners were put together in Vladimir Prison.

In February-March 1948, the status of special prisons was introduced and assigned to three MVD prisons for convicts – located in the cities of Vladimir, Verkhne-Uralsk and Aleksandrovsk. They became “prisons with special regime for keeping the most dangerous state criminals,” meaning that only the most important political convicts were sent and kept there. Vladimir Prison was not only “special”, but its administration reported directly to the head of the MVD Prison Directorate. However, the MGB Prison Department was in charge of ordering to send a particular political convict to this prison. In other words, two ministries, the MGB and MVD were involved in sending a convict to and keeping him/her in a special prison. Apparently, the sequentially numbered prisoners (from no. 21 on) started to be sent to Vladimir Prison after it acquired the “special” status.

In October 1949, all three special prisons were transferred from the MVD under the MGB jurisdiction. After this, the MGB Prison Department was in charge of sending a convicted prisoner to this prison and supervising his/her presence there. Despite the formal change of subordination, the sequential numbering continued, which points to the MGB Prison Directorate as the unit that assigned the numbers.

However, the order to assign a number, apparently, came from the top of the NKGB/MGB leadership, and in at least some cases with an approval by Josef Stalin himself. The case of Konstantin Ordzhonikidze, Prisoner no. 3, not studied during the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1991-2000, points to this possibility.

Konstantin Ordzhonikidze was a younger brother of Sergo (Georgy) Ordzhonikidze, one of the closest Stalin’s Communist Party co-workers. In February 1937, in the middle of the so-called Great Terror, Sergo Ordzhonikidze committed suicide, evidently for preventing arrest (according to another version, he was murdered). At the time, his older brother, Pavel, had already been arrested, and in November 1937, he was executed. Because of the closeness of Sergo Ordzhonikidze to Stalin, Pavel’s arrest could not take place without Stalin’s personal approval.

On May 5, 1941, Konstantin Ordzhonikidze was arrested by the NKGB operatives – obviously, also after Stalin’s approval. From 1941 and until August 1944, he was interrogated only three times. On August 26, 1944, the OSO NKVD sentenced Ordzhonikidze to a 5-year imprisonment for an “illegal possession of firearms” (two handguns were found during a NKGB search in his apartment) and as a “socio-dangerous element.” The last accusation was usually applied to an arrestee when investigators did not have any evidence against him/her. In other words, Konstantin Ordzhonikidze was punished as Sergo’s brother.

69. According to the MVD/MGB plan, on the whole three special prisons should have contained about 5 000 inmates. At the same time, special labor camps were organized exclusively for political convicts (prisoners sentenced under Articles 58 and 59 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code). On January 1, 1950, there were nine such special camps with 171 165 inmates. Later two more special camps, nos. 10-11, were built. See details in: Nikita Petrov. The GULAG Empire History. Chapters 16 and 17 (in Russian), http://www.pseudology.org/GULAG/Glava16.htm, http://www.pseudology.org/GULAG/Glava17.htm.

70. The other members of the family were also persecuted. Pavel’s wife was also executed. After Sergo’s death, Sergo’s wife, one more brother Ivan, and his wife were arrested and sentenced to long terms in the GULAG.
Bogdan Kobulov, 1st deputy NKGB Commissar, ordered keeping the convicted Ordzhonikidze in solitary confinement.\(^{71}\) Ordzhonikidze was sent to Vladimir Prison; probably, at this point a number was assigned to him.\(^{72}\)

In 1946, on the order of Viktor Abakumov, MGB Minister, Ordzhonikidze’s case was sent again now to the OSO MGB.\(^{73}\) Taking into consideration that Abakumov reported to Stalin practically on a daily basis, it is likely that Abakumov acted on Stalin’s order. On November 30, 1946, the OSO MGB sentenced Ordzhonikidze to an additional 10-year imprisonment. If the no. 3 was assigned to Ordzhonikidze not previously, probably this was the point when Abakumov ordered to do that.

In 1951, after the end of his term, Ordzhonikidze was still kept in Vladimir Prison as Prisoner no. 3 even without a formal continuation of his term. On March 4, 1953 (it was a day before Stalin’s death) the OSO MGB sentenced Ordzhonikidze for the third time to an additional 5-year imprisonment. Soon after Stalin’s death, in April 1953 Ordzhonikidze was released due to the amnesty announced on March 27, 1953.\(^{74}\) Before he was released, Ordzhonikidze went on a hunger strike and was force-fed.\(^{75}\)

It should be noted that prisoners nos. 21 (Nikolai Molochnikov), 22 (Evgeniya Allilueva) and 23 (Anna Allilueva), brought in Vladimir Prison in June 1948, were Stalin’s relatives.\(^{76}\) As in Konstantin Ordzhonikidze’s case, their arrest and punishment, including solitary confinement and numbering, needed Stalin’s personal approval. Therefore, even if the numbering was made on Abakumov’s order by, most likely, the MGB Prison Department, probably Stalin himself approved this measure.

There is a strong possibility that a study of documents in Ordzhonikidze’s Personal File can give some light on the process of assigning numbers to convicted important political prisoners. And if this file has survived, it should be carefully inspected.

There is a question regarding Prisoner no. 1 that has not been clarified by Russian archivists. In fact, two cards with no. 1 were found in the kartoteka of Vladimir Prison in 1990. One of these prisoners was identified as Anton (Antanas) Merkys, the former last Prime Minister (November 1939-June 1940) of

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73. The OSO NKVD/MVD existed from 1934 to 1950; from November 1946 to July 1950, there were two OSOs, the MGB and MVD. However, from 1946 to 1953 the cases investigated in the MGB were sent for a trial to the OSO MGB. See Kokurin and Petrov. Lubyanka: Organs of the VCheKa—OGPU—NKVD—NKGB—MGB—MVD—KGB. P. 234-235 (in Russian).


76. On the Alliluev Case and prisoners nos. 21-23, see Birstein. The Perversion of Knowledge. Pp. 52-58, 434-444.
independent Lithuania. Merkys, his wife and 19-year-old son were arrested in 1941 and on April 16, 1952, they were sentenced by the OSO MGB to 25-year imprisonment each. The second card, marked “Prisoner no. 1”, does not have the real name of the prisoner and contains very restricted information. It is only mentioned on it that he was a Hungarian, born in 1909, arrested, apparently, in 1940 and sentenced to a 25-year imprisonment — most likely, in 1952, because he was placed with Antanas Merkys in Cell 9 of Corpus (Building) 2 of Vladimir Prison on the same day as Merkys, May 12, 1952. The next day the Hungarian was moved to Cell 42 in Corpus 3, while Merkys remained alone in Cell 9. The card of the Hungarian is marked by two Russian capital letters “VD” — an abbreviation meaning “vazhnye dela”, i.e., “important cases.”

An additional puzzle with the numbered prisoners in Vladimir Prison is that a few prisoner files studied in 1991 in the Special Archive (now the RGVA) also had numbers. For instance, on the cover of Horst Kitschmann’s Personal File there was a note made by pencil: “Vladimir no. 25.” Anatoly Prokopenko, at the time director of that archive, could not explain this note.

14. SMERSH/MGB Documents

In 1994, FSB representatives handed over to the Swedish Group a document entitled “Collections [fondy in Russian] of Archival Materials That Have Been Looked Through In Connection With the Fate of R. Wallenberg.” This list consists of 25 points with very general names of the SMERSH, MGB, NKVD, NKGB and KGB units and three NKGB/MGB prisons. Here are some examples:

1. Counterintelligence SMERSH Directorate of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.


13. MGB/KGB Secretariat, 1945-1962 [i.e., Abakumov’s Secretariat from 1946-1951].

15. 3rd MGB Main Directorate [military counterintelligence], 1946-1949.


Clearly, each of these collections included thousands of files, and inspecting them would be long-time work of many archivists. However, no archival attribution of materials was given and there was no explanation how the study was organized, who carried it out and no results were described.

The Swedish part of the Working Group did not insist on an independent review of these collections. It is highly questionable that such enormous collections like documents in Abakumov’s secretariat or Kartashov’s department (for the years 1946-49) that investigated the Wallenberg case and

77. No. 2 was assigned to Anton Merkys’s wife, Maria, and no. 4, to his son, Gediminas.
the Department “A” (registration and archives) do not contain any documentation regarding Wallenberg, Langfelder and their cell-mates. All these collections must be studied by independent researchers.

15. The Murder of Isai Oggins, an American citizen, in 1947

Soviet and Russian officials repeatedly pointed to the similarities between the Wallenberg case and his presumed death and the case of the prisoner Isai S. Oggins. Oggins was an American Communist who in 1930s worked for the Soviet intelligence in China. In 1939, he was arrested by the NKVD and in 1940 sentenced to 8-year imprisonment for espionage.

Fig. 7. Isai Oggins. Photo made after his arrest in 1939, http://www.thelostspy.com/gallery.php

In July 1946, MGB Minister Viktor Abakumov sent Molotov a letter reminding him about the Oggins case and saying that in eight months Oggins would be released. Apparently, Stalin and Molotov asked Abakumov to present a plan of Oggins’s assassination because on May 21, 1947, in a special letter addressed to Stalin and Molotov Abakumov suggested how to kill Oggins and then inform the United States Embassy in Moscow that Oggins had died of tuberculosis in the city of Norilsk (one of the GULAG centers), where he had been previously imprisoned.79 According to Nikita Petrov, after the Politburo’s approval (on June 10, 1947 Molotov personally instructed Abakumov), Oggins was killed by an injection of poison in the MGB special toxicology laboratory in Moscow.80 The MGB subsequently created a false document stating that Oggins supposedly died of a heart attack in January 1947 in the city of Penza prison.81

81. In 2005, the FSB produced the second falsified copy with the same date of death, January 13, 1947, but a little bit different other information. This copy was given to Oggins’s son, Professor Robin Oggins (USA).
A censored copy of Abakumov’s letter dated May 21, 1947 with a plan to kill Oggins was released in the 1990s without any indication from what collection and archive it had originated – like the Smoltsov Report. Evidently, the letter should be released in full since a part of it had been redacted before the release. The information in which archival file this letter was found (there are file page numbers 284-286 on the released copy) should be provided because this archival file may contain similar information about the fate of Wallenberg.\(^\text{82}\)

In 2009, the FSB archivists informed independent researchers that “from November 16, 1945 on, Oggins was kept in Inner [Lubyanka] Prison... After December 20, 1946 [Oggins] was transferred to Penza Prison no. 1. The forcible death of Oggins took place on July 5, 1947, after which he [i.e., the body] was buried at the Jewish Cemetery in the city of Penza. The death of the American was registered at the fictional date of January 13, 1947.” Therefore, it remains unclear precisely when and where, in fact, Oggins was killed, which make the cases of Wallenberg and Oggins really similar.

In spite of repeated requests, FSB archivists have never provided documents on Oggins’s transfer to Penza, his arrival in Penza Prison and his burial in the Jewish cemetery. Surprisingly, local Penza independent researchers did not find registration of Oggins’s burial in the records of that cemetery.\(^\text{83}\)

Independent researchers need to examine Oggins’s Archival-Investigation File, as well as the FSB Central Archive should provide all documentation relevant to the incarceration of Oggins in Moscow prisons in 1945-46, as well as to his death.

It is of some interest also to study and compare the cases of other foreign diplomats and prominent foreigners imprisoned in the Soviet Union after 1945, including the Austrian diplomat Ferdinand Marek, the former Hungarian Prime Minister Count István Bethlen and Fumitaka Konoe, son of the former Prime Minister of Japan, Fumimoro Konoe.\(^\text{84}\)

16. Other Swedes in Soviet Prisons and Records of Vladimir Prison

1) Already in 1990, researchers of the first International Commission identified all but six of the numbered prisoners who were sentenced between the spring of 1947 and May 1948, the most crucial period in the Raoul Wallenberg case. The cards for prisoners with the numbers 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 have never been found and it remains unknown if prisoners with these numbers, in fact, were sent to Vladimir Prison after sentencing.

2) Researchers have repeatedly requested access to Russia’s extensive statistical records regarding prisoners held in Soviet camps and prisons, in order to obtain a more complete picture of all Swedish nationals/citizens held in Soviet captivity after 1945.

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\(^\text{82}\) The released copy has a number 4 – in other words, there are four copies of the letter in various files.

\(^\text{83}\) On Dr. Birstein’s request, members of the Penza branch of the “Memorial” Society checked records of that cemetery. There was no record for Isai Oggins.

\(^\text{84}\) Ferdinand Marek (1881-1947) served as Austrian Minister to Czechoslovakia since 1922; Count István Bethlen (1874-1945) served as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1921-1931; Fumitaka Konoe (1915-1956) attended Princeton University from 1934-37, and later, during World War II, served as a military officer in the Japanese Army.
The reports of Valdimir Prison Chief Warden (nachal'nik) sent on a regular basis to the central MVD/MGB prison authorities in Moscow are of a particular interest. Heads of Special [Labor] Camps (established in 1948 for sentenced political prisoners), for example, had to provide detailed annual reports about the camps they oversaw. These reports included precise information about the prisoner population, such as the number of prisoners, their nationalities, etc.

It would be important to know if wardens of the three special prisons in the cities of Vladimir, Aleksandrovsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, had to provide similar reports. And if so, how often -- annually? Bi-annually? Monthly? Of great use would be a sample report from the year 1950, when Vladimir Prison belonged to the MGB, and from the year 1956.

3) In addition to prisoner cards, the warden of Vladimir Prison must have had other records at his disposal which allowed him and his personnel to track prisoners’ whereabouts on a daily basis, such as special registers or lists, daily floor and cell plans, etc. These internal administrative records have never been made available to researchers. It needs to be established if this documentation survives. If so, it should be made available for review for specific years.

4) Professor Marvin Makinen, a U.S. citizen who as a young student was imprisoned in Vladimir Prison from 1960-1963, was told by his cellmate, a Latvian prisoner by the name of Zigurds Krumins, about a highly secret Swedish prisoner being held in Vladimir Prison some time before 1961. Apparently, the man had been arrested on charges of espionage. In Vladimir Prison, Krumins shared cells with important foreign prisoners, including the American U-2 Pilot Francis Gary Powers.

Another prisoner later confirmed to Professor Makinen that Krumins had apparently shared a cell with a Swedish prisoner. Over the years, at least a half of a dozen other former prisoners have testified about hearing of a secret Swedish prisoner in Vladimir. If not Raoul Wallenberg, who was this man?

Researcher have so far not been allowed to review the documentation regarding Krumins's detention that is available in the Russian State Archive (GARF). This material includes his Archival-Investigation File, as well as still secret documentation concerning his official pardon.

It needs to be determined if there were prisoners held whose prisoner cards are not included in the current prison “kartoteka” – the file of prisoner cards in the Administration Office of Vladimir Prison.

5) A former Vladimir Prison employee, Varvara Larina, stated in an interview in 1993 that a prisoner matching Raoul Wallenberg’s description (she was shown Wallenberg’s photo, as part of a series of photographs depicting persons of various ages and appearances) had been held in isolation in Corpus (Building) 2 of Vladimir Prison for some time in the mid-1950s until the early 1960s. The photo Larina initially identified as that of Raoul Wallenberg was a profile picture rarely published in the

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85. It is known that at least Warden of Aleksandrovsk Prison made reports on the inmate contingent. According to one of these reports, by 1953, the following types of “especially dangerous state criminals” were kept in this prison: 115 of the former “foreign agents” (of them, 25 were allegedly American agents, 9 -- British agents, 15 -- French agents, 3 -- Austrian agents, and 18 -- other countries agents); 15 of the former supporters of Leo Trotsky; 25 of “terrorists”, 19 of “saboteurs”, 16 of “nationalists”, 57 of “gangsters”, and 79 of other convicts. See O. V. Afanasov. “To the History of the MVD USSR Aleksandrovsk Special Prison in the Irkutsk Region” (2009) (in Russian), http://www.penpolit.ru/papers/detail2.php?ELEMENT_ID=942.
international press. Another former employee of Vladimir Prison, Aleksandr Timofeyevich Kukin, also identified Wallenberg’s photo.86

Larina stated, in particular, that the foreign prisoner she identified as Raoul Wallenberg had been held in the cell located opposite of the one housing a prisoner called Kirill Os’mak who died on May 15, 1960.87 At the time he was kept in Cell 49 of the Corpus 2. He shared this cell with the former Georgian politician Shalva Berishvili, in 1944 sentenced to a 25-year imprisonment.

In 2004, the daughter of Os’mak Natalia received permission to move her father’s body from Vladimir to a cemetery in the city of Kiev. The identification of his burial site in the Vladimir City Cemetery became possible due to descriptions in the letters by Berishvili, Os’mak’s former cellmate, written in 1991; at the time, he lived in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.88 The same year the Swedish-Russian Working Group was formed, but, unfortunately, the Group did not know that 92-year old Berishvili was still alive and made no effort to find him.

However, there is a high possibility that Larina and Kukin misidentified the prisoner. The presence of Raul Wallenberg in Vladimir Prison is unlikely. To be transferred to Vladimir Prison, he should have been sentenced since only convicted prisoners were sent there, and there is no information that Wallenberg was ever sentenced. In 1947, when Wallenberg theoretically could have been sent to Vladimir after being kept in Lubyanka Prison, all three special prisons, including Vladimir Prison, belonged to the MVD punishment system of prisons and camps, and not the MGB, and, therefore, the second ministry MVD would have been involved in his case. However, there is no documentary proof showing his presence under this ministry – his prisoner card was not found in the general kartoteka of this ministry. Still, the matter must be fully clarified.

Finally, to keep an arrestee in secrecy, Viktor Abakumov, as head of the GUKR SMERSH and later of the MGB, for this purpose used the most secret Sukhanovo Prison in Moscow, where some prisoners were concealed for many years without interrogation.89 There were also cases when a convicted prisoner was called from the GULAG system of labor camps to the MGB headquarters in Moscow for an additional interrogation, and on Abakumov’s order such a prisoner was kept for years in Sukhanovo Prison.

Therefore, if Wallenberg was alive after July 1947, he would have probably been kept in Sukhanovo Prison that belonged to the MGB, and not the MVD. But FSB archivists have strongly denied that he was ever sent to Sukhanovo, and the question remains open.

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87. During WWII, Professor K. I. Os’mak (1890-1960) headed the underground nationalist Ukrainian Parliament, called “Chief Liberation Council,” that was in charge of the Ukrainian partisan war for independent Ukraine against both the Nazis and the Soviets. In 1944, Os’mak was arrested, and the Ukrainian NKGB/MGB in Kiev conducted the investigation. On July 10, 1948, the OSO MGB in Moscow sentenced him “for participation in counterrevolutionary gangs of Ukrainian nationalists” to 25-year imprisonment. Os’mak was kept in the MVD Kiev Prison, but in May 1953 he was transferred to Vladimir Prison.
It needs to be determined, if possible, what prisoner(s) occupied the cells opposite to that of Os’mak. To identify the prisoner in Vladimir Prison who Larina and Kukin had in mind, the names of all foreign prisoners held in Vladimir Prison during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s should be released.

6) It is necessary to establish the whereabouts of Giovanni Felix Italiener (or Felix Italiener; b. 1919) from March 23, 1957 to July 1958. The memoir by Morris Hershman (Moris Gershm in Russian documents), an American who spent many years in Soviet captivity, mentions that Italiener was in Vladimir Prison in 1956/57. If Italiener was indeed in Vladimir Prison, even for a short time, his presence could have added to the confusion about a secret Swedish prisoner held there.

According to the archival records in Sweden (UD Archive, Riksarkivet, SÄPO, and Utlänningskommmission), Italiener claimed that on March 23, 1957 he was arrested in the Soviet Union for a second time, while living in the town of Kalinin. He was supposedly sentenced to an additional year in prison for taking unauthorized trips to Moscow, to the Swedish Embassy. Previously, in 1956, Italiener was issued a so-called “foreigner passport” by the Swedish authorities; however, he apparently left the Soviet Union on a German passport. Italiener claimed that his "foreigner passport" was confiscated by the Soviet officials after his second arrest.

The FSB Central Archive should clarify Italiener’s whereabouts from 1957–58, to either confirm or dismiss Morris Hershman's statements.

7) The detailed testimony given by Ludwig Hunoldt, a former German prisoner of war, about a Swedish man named "Eriksson" held in Corpus II of Vladimir Prison in 1950 raises the question why his card was missing in the kartoteka of prisoner cards in Vladimir Prison.

It needs to be established if the card of this prisoner has been withdrawn, or if Hunoldt was held under a different name or if he provided later incorrect information.

II. SVR (Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, formerly part of the KGB) Archives

Since 2001, researchers have repeatedly requested partial access to the following files:

1) Reports and other communication from the rezidentura (Soviet foreign intelligence group) at the Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, regarding Raoul Wallenberg have never been released from the KGB/SVR Archive.

These materials will provide important information about Wallenberg’s early contacts with prominent political figures, such as the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, as

90. Morris Hershman’s memoirs were published only in Russian: Hershman M. D. Priklyucheniya amerikantsa v Rossii (1931-1990) [Adventures of an American in Russia, 1931-1990]. New York, 1995. Pp. 177-178; http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/auth/?t=page&num=11530. In 1948, the MGB Special Board sentenced Morris Hershman (1926-?), a painter and the son of an American communist, to a 25-year imprisonment for “treason and espionage” (he tried to return to the U.S.) In 1949, as a prisoner, Hershman worked together with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the secret MGB institute “Marfin.”

91. These NKGB reports from Stockholm should not be confused with the recently released Soviet diplomatic cipher cable traffic from 1944 to 1947. On the released diplomatic cables, see Matz. “Cables in Cipher.”
well as with Iver Olsen, a member of the U.S. intelligence service in Sweden (The Office of Strategic Services, OSS), who participated in Wallenberg’s appointment to the Swedish Legation, Budapest, in 1944.\textsuperscript{92} They would provide important information about what exactly Soviet authorities knew about Raoul Wallenberg and how they assessed his contacts in Stockholm.

Possibly, the NKGB reports could also clarify if Raoul Wallenberg had any contacts with Alexandra Kollontay, Soviet Envoy (Ambassador) to Sweden, while he was in Budapest in 1944/45, as has been alleged by Elisabeth Kemény-Fuchs, wife of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Foreign Minister Gábor Kemény.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{2) Intelligence reports from Hungary from 1944 to 1945.}

\textbf{a)} Colonel Igor Prelin, at the time head of the KGB Press Service, stated on numerous occasions that the Soviet Foreign Intelligence had important intelligence sources in Hungary.\textsuperscript{94} This material has been repeatedly requested.

In 2007, a detailed request concerning reports by the Soviet field agents about the activities of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish Legation (including interviews conducted with Raoul Wallenberg’s diplomatic colleagues in March 1945, as mentioned above) was filed.

Also, requests for specific information about the activities of the Hungarian resistance movement with whom both Wallenberg and his Swedish colleagues at the Legation maintained close contact. This includes the work of a number of British and Dutch officers who escaped from German POW camps and joined the underground resistance movement. In 1944-45, they received formal support from the Swedish Legation, Budapest. Several of them personally knew and worked with Raoul Wallenberg.

The access to all that information was denied because this documentation remains classified.

\textbf{b)} In the meantime, this information is directly related to the Wallenberg Case. One of the Dutch officers, Lt. Gerrit van der Waals, was arrested by SMERSH operatives on December 6, 1944, together with the Hungarian Charles (Karl) Schandl, who was connected to the Budapest underground and knew Wallenberg.\textsuperscript{95} They were brought to Moscow and until September 1946, they were interrogated in Kartashov’s department; it is known that in at least one of the interrogations the investigator questioned van der Waals about Wallenberg. Then they were transferred under the 2-A Department


\textsuperscript{93.} See, for example, Eric Sjöquist. \textit{Raoul Wallenberg}. Stockholm: Normans förlag, 1985 (in Swedish). We use the spelling of Kollontay’s surname with the letter “y” at the end – this way she wrote her last name by herself.

\textsuperscript{94.} KGB Colonel I. N. Prelin joined the KGB in 1961. At the beginning of his career, he served in the 2nd KGB Main Directorate (counterintelligence), then moved to the 1st KGB Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). In the 1990s, he worked at the KGB Press Service (KGB Center for Public Contacts).

\textsuperscript{95.} Apparently, Soviet investigators and prison personnel did not know how to correctly write in Russian the name of Gerrit van der Waals. In the documents in his Personal File, he was usually called “Herit Van-der-Wals” or “Herit Vanderwals.” See “File of the Arrestee Van-der-Waals.” RGVA. Fond/Collection 465-P. Opis’/Register 10. File 40242.
(fighting British agents) of the 2nd MGB Main Directorate (interior counterintelligence) because the MGB investigators considered these prisoners to be British agents.\footnote{There is a note on Schandl’s Prisoner Card in Vladimir Prison: “USA spy.” Possibly, saying a US, not British, spy was a mistake made by a person who filled in the card.}

On August 11, 1948, van der Waals died in the Butyrka Prison Hospital, while Schandl and two other Hungarians, who also were considered British agents, were sentenced in June 1950 as British spies to 25-year imprisonment. They were sent to Vladimir Prison, where they were kept under nos. 24 (Tibor Klement), 25 (Laszlo Pap), and 26 (Schandl). Of them, in fact, Tibor Klement (aka Lewis Kliment and Lajos Klement) was a member of the British intelligence organization Special Operation Executive or SOE. It is known that SOE and Soviet Foreign Intelligence had contacts in Hungary in 1944-45.\footnote{File HS 4/103 (SOE/Soviet/NKVD relations in Hungary) in The National Archives (Kew, Great Britain).}

All Soviet foreign reports regarding contacts between the Swedish officials in Budapest and foreign intelligence representatives, especially from the U.S. – the OSS, The Pond, Joint American Distribution Committee, – as well as the Great Britain and Germany, who were active in 1944-45 in Hungary and surrounding countries, including Turkey, are of great interest.

Additionally, all information on the contacts of Swedish diplomats, including Raoul Wallenberg, in Hungary with the Jewish resistance network at the time such as the Vaadah, Zionist Youth Movement and others should be released.

c) Soviet Foreign Intelligence reports regarding the Holocaust in Hungary for the years 1941-1945 are of special interest and should be released.

These materials should include reports about activities and contacts of individual Nazi officials like Adolf Eichmann, SS-Officer in charge of Jewish deportation, as well as Edmund Veesenmayer, Plenipotentiary of Hungary, and the others, with the Swedish Legation in Budapest and particularly with Raoul Wallenberg.

The documentation regarding the activities of German intelligence representatives and agencies in Hungary and Sweden for the years 1941-1945 should be released.

d) In September 1944, the American War Refugee Board asked Raoul Wallenberg to check on the precise circumstances of the kidnapping and detention (in Mauthausen concentration camp) of Leopold Ashner, the Jewish Director of the large electrical company TUNGSRAM.

It needs to be determined if Raoul Wallenberg had an active role in the negotiations with the German and Hungarian Nazi authorities in Hungary leading to Ashner’s release.

e) Boris Rybkin, foreign intelligence \textit{rezident} (head of an intelligence group) at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm of the time was in charge of paying Wallenbergs’ Enskilda Bank in 1943 with platinum for ball bearing shipments to the Soviet Union.\footnote{From 1935 to 1939, Boris Arkadievich Rybkin (1899-1947), under the name of Boris Yartsev, headed a \textit{rezidentura} at the Soviet Legation in Helsinki, Finland. In Stockholm, he was from September 1941 to July 1943. In November 1947, he was killed by the Swedish police.} The American Allies even offered to transport the ball
bearings from Sweden to the Soviet Union. Most probably, Rybkin’s subordinate Igor Spichkin, also a NKVD/NKGB officer, was involved in the ball bearing payment. All these activities must have been reflected in reports to Moscow.

The SVR Archive should release documentation about these events.

3) Requests to provide access to the files of Count Mikhail Kutuzov-Tolstoy — Operational File (if he was, in fact, Soviet agent) and/or Personal File — for information regarding Raoul Wallenberg and his work at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, in 1944, were repeatedly denied. According to Col. Vinogradov, Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s file had contained a "character sketch" of members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest, including Raoul Wallenberg, authored by Kutuzov-Tolstoy that later was allegedly destroyed. Requests to review the administrative order for the paper’s destruction (referred to by Col. Vinogradov) have remained unanswered.

Anatolii Prokopenko, the former head of the Special (now Military) Archive in Moscow, claimed that he had seen Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s file in 1991, in a KGB archive outside of Moscow. Since then, apparently this file has been kept in the SVR archives in Moscow.

During the late 1990s, Ambassador Hans Magnusson requested that a member of the Russian Foreign Ministry be given access to Kutuzov-Tolstoy’s file. This request was granted, with the official reporting back that the documentation contained "no information that was not already known." No formal written report of this review was apparently ever made.

It remains unknown what file the Russian official studied. If that was a Personal File, does this mean that Kutuzov-Tolstoy was, in fact, a Soviet agent? Did he report on Raoul Wallenberg and the other Swedish diplomats as an agent?

4) The access to Soviet intelligence reports concerning members of the Wallenberg Family (especially bankers Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg), as well as Raoul Wallenberg, have been consistently denied since 2001, even though it has been established that such a collection does exist. This documentation could provide important leads to understand why Joseph Stalin decided to arrest Raoul Wallenberg, as well as offer clues about how the case information was handled in the Soviet bureaucracy.

It is necessary to stress the point that the Wallenberg brothers played a leading role in the negotiations about a Swedish-Soviet Trade Agreement in October 1946, as well as earlier, during similar discussions in 1940. The internal deliberations on the Soviet side regarding these negotiations in 1946 have never been made available for review. Even more important is the question if the Soviets considered the release of Raoul Wallenberg during those negotiations and if the Swedish side ever raised the issue.


99. Previously, from 1940-41, I. M. Spichkin headed the Foreign Intelligence rezidentura in Vienna, Austria.
The background information about the Wallenberg family is crucial for the case and should be released.

5) In 2007, researchers asked the SVR to provide information about Jacob Wallenberg’s approach to the Soviet government through foreign intelligence intermediaries in Czechoslovakia in 1954, regarding Raoul Wallenberg. SVR’s reply was that no information about this initiative is available. Evidently, this question remains pending.

6) As the historian Craig G. McKay has pointed out, in her memoirs Nina Langlet, who was already mentioned, claimed that in 1945 NKGB officer Spichkin was a member of the Soviet part of the Allied Control Commission in Budapest and that he signed the document "announcing the departure of Swedish diplomatic personnel" in March 1945.100

This claim and Spichkin’s supposed official function in Budapest in 1945 needs to be clarified by the SVR as well.

7) Requests to inspect the materials regarding contacts between the Soviet diplomat and foreign intelligence officer Pavel Yerzin and the Finnish diplomat Åke Frey in 1955-57 were repeatedly denied. These discussions, conducted during the months before the release of the so-called Gromyko Memorandum in February 1957, unofficially confirmed for the first time that Wallenberg was held prisoner in the Soviet Union.101

All records regarding these discussions needs to be released.

8) In his memoir, General Serov claims that Stalin ordered Wallenberg arrested after an orientirovka (information) about Wallenberg’s “connections with Hitler’s special services and American intelligence” came from the 1st NKGB Directorate (foreign intelligence) (p. 536). This information was never released to the Working Group and the SVR (current foreign intelligence) representatives always insisted that they have no archival documents about Wallenberg.

The orientirovka and all related documents should be released.

III. Archives to Be Checked About Specific Issues

1. Defense Ministry Central Archive (TsAMO RF)

   a) The Razvedupr (RU, field military intelligence) Collection

It is known that in 1944 the Razvedupr had a network of agents in Hungary and this organization participated in bringing Hungarian delegations for peace negotiations to Moscow and in the negotiations.102 After Wallenberg had been detained at the headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front,

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101. During WWII, from 1941 on, Pavel Dmitrievich Yerzin (with the pseudonym “Yerofel”) was a member of the Foreign Intelligence rezidentura in London; from 1947 to 1952, he headed the Foreign Intelligence rezidentura in Deli, India.
most probably he was debriefed not only by SMERSH (which is known), but also by military intelligence officers. There is a possibility that transcripts of these interrogations might provide some light on Wallenberg’s detention and the arrest that followed. This information has never been requested or offered for review.

These materials should be checked and released.

b) The GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate, military foreign intelligence) Collection

During the work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group, the Russian side provided no documentation from the archive of the Main Intelligence Directorate – military foreign intelligence. In the meantime, most of the above-listed questions to the SVR Archive are relevant also to the GRU Archive. The following materials, if they exist in this archive, should be provided:

1) Reports about Wallenberg’s early contacts with the prominent Hungarian political figures in Stockholm and with Iver Olsen, a member of the U.S. OSS group in Stockholm, who participated in Wallenberg’s appointment to the Swedish Legation, Budapest, in 1944.

2) Reports on the activities of the Hungarian resistance movement, including the Jewish resistance network, and its leaders with whom both Wallenberg and his Swedish colleagues maintained close contact, and on these contacts.

3) Reports regarding contacts between the Swedish officials and foreign intelligence representatives (especially from the U.S., Great Britain Germany) who were active Hungary and surrounding countries, including Turkey.

4) Reports regarding the Holocaust in Hungary for the years 1941-45, and Adolf Eichmann, and Edmund Veesenmayer personally, as well as on their contacts with Raoul Wallenberg.

5) Reports on the rumors about Raoul Wallenberg’s alleged contact with Walter Schellenberg and his agents in Hungary and Sweden.

6) Reports on Dutch officers in Budapest and their connections with the Swedish Legation and Raoul Wallenberg.

7) Reports on separate peace negotiations between the Hungarian, Allied and German representatives in Stockholm during the years 1941-45 and the alleged involvement of the Wallenberg family members of in them.

c) The Red Army Political Directorate Collection
From a few documents released from the Russian Central Military Archive (TsA MO) about Wallenberg’s early detention, it is known that reports about his captivity were sent from the field units not only to the military superiors, but also through the political chain of subordination. No report to the Red Army Political Directorate in Moscow (in fact, it was part of the Party’s Central Committee) was released by the Russian officials. It is necessary to check if reports on Wallenberg reached this Directorate. Unfortunately, the TsAMO is practically closed for independent researchers.

Among the documents the FSB released in 1991, there is a report of the head of the Political Department the 151st Division, Dmitrienko, to the Head of the Political Department of the 7th Army, on the detention of Wallenberg and Langfelder in the house no. 16 on the Benczur Street, dated January 14, 1945. This line of command was not pursued by the Swedish-Russian Working Group, only inquiries about Dmitrienko were made.

However, this line is especially important because the Red Army Political Directorate was, in fact, not a part of the military command, but part of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party, and its head, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, was not only a CC’s Politburo candidate member, but also a deputy Defense Commissar, i.e., Stalin’s deputy. It is known that in the case of Count István Bethlen, who was detained approximately at the same time as Wallenberg, interrogations by political officers were intense and there was a detailed correspondence of field units with Moscow headquarters (these documents, and not SMERSH materials, were released to the public in the 1990s). This information strongly suggests a possibility of existence of documents regarding the Wallenberg Case in the archive of the Political Directorate.

In May 2012, FSB archivists stated that except Dmitrienko’s report, “there is no additional documents in the FSB Central Archive of Russia on the detention of the Swedish diplomats and their interrogations, as well as interrogations of Wallenberg by the Political Directorate of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.” Therefore, the relevant documentation should be in the archive of Political Directorate.

It is crucial for the case to check the archive of the Political Directorate for reports about and the debriefings of Wallenberg and Langfelder while they were detained in the military headquarters of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

It would also be of some interest to determine the exact time schedule and travel route for the transfer of Wallenberg and Langfelder from Budapest to Moscow during the period from January 17, 1945 to February 5, 1945.

d) Various Collections

1) As already mentioned, the TsAMO materials should be also checked for reports on the debriefing of the Swedish diplomats from the Legation in Budapest, detained by the Soviet troops.
2) Archival materials about Count Kutuzov-Tolstoy might also be kept in the TsAMO, since after the war he served as a teacher of foreign languages of officers of the Political Department of the Soviet part of the Allied Control Commission in Budapest. Therefore, the TsAMO materials should be checked for possible information about Kutuzov-Tolstoy.

2. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry (MID) Archive (AVP RF)

1) Previously, the AVP RF released some of Alexandra Kollontay’s reports and cables and other NKID officials about the Wallenberg brothers and Raoul Wallenberg; all information on the Wallenbergs and their activities should be released for the years 1940-1946.103

2) Reports on the role of the Wallenberg brothers in the trade negotiations in 1940 and 1946 should be made available.

3) Information that Raoul Wallenberg had been taken to Moscow was received by the American Military Section of the Allied Control Commission (ACC), Hungary, as early as in May 1945. On request from the U.S. Department of State, on May 7, 1945, General William S. Key raised the issue of Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance, as well as of two Swiss diplomats, Harold Feller and Max Meyer, with Major General Ivan Lyovushkin, head of the ACC Headquarters, and Grigorii Pushkin, Soviet Political Adviser at the ACC, a representative of the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissariat (NKID) and the future Soviet Ambassador to Hungary.104 Lyovushkin indicated in subsequent discussions that the three diplomats “almost certainly” had been interned and that he had written many letters to different Soviet agencies to determine their whereabouts, without success.

In 2010, in answer to a request by S. Berger and Dr. Birstein, the Russian MID released from its archive a copy of a letter written by Colonel Henry G. Simmonite, assistant to General Key, dated May 11, 1945, and a Russian translation of it made a few days later.105 The last paragraph of Col. Simmonite’s letter states: “Our Government is particularly anxious to obtain any information on these three persons in view of their service to the United States and any information as to their preset location would be appreciated.” Most likely, for the Soviet authorities this statement was very disturbing, -- this general phrasing could have further enhanced their suspicions that Wallenberg possibly was an American spy.

103. Apparently, in his business activity before the Budapest assignment, Raoul Wallenberg was much closer connected to the Wallenberg brothers than it was previously considered. See Susanne Berger and Vadim Birstein. “Blasieholmsgatan’s Secrets,” http://www.vbirstein.com/2016/11/01/wallenberg-in-blasieholmsgatan/

104. See Susanne Berger. Swedish Aspects of the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 2001. The records of the American Section of the Allied Control Council, Hungary are also available at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). See Records of Interservice Agencies, U.S. Representative, ACC Hungary 1945-1947, RG 334, Box 38. It is unclear if and how this information was shared with the Swedish government.

105. MID’s cover letter to the documents was addressed to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. There was no indication in what AVP RF collection Simmonite’s letter and its Russian translation were found. Interestingly, although Simmonite’s letter the name of Wallenberg was spelled correctly, the military translator wrote it in Russian as “Wolenberg,” with “о” instead of “а” and one letter “l”.
There is a handwritten resolution in Russian on the translated letter, dated May 17, 1945: “C.[omrade] Lyovushkin informed Col. Simmonite, that [in answer to] our inquiry, [they] were not found. [Put] into the file.” There are also unidentifiable initials under the resolution, “M. T.” In other words, Moscow decided not to continue this communication.

However, the whole issue regarding General Lyovushkin's actions and communications needs clarification.

The reports by Pushkin and his staff, as well as transcripts of conversations of Pushkin with Vladimir Dekanozov, deputy NKID Commissar, via the secret state communication line, are kept in the AVP RF.106

All documentation regarding the search for Raoul Wallenberg conducted via the channels of the ACC Soviet Section, including the NKID reports, should be made available for independent review.

4) A series of diplomatic meetings regarding Raoul Wallenberg from 1953 to 1956 is mentioned in the already cited Swedish report published in 2003.107 Similar records were not released publicly by the Russian side of the Working Group. These meetings were not also mentioned in the 2000 Russian report of the Working Group.108 According to Ambassador Hans Magnusson, a co-chairman of the Working Group, some of these Russian materials were shown to the representatives of the Swedish side.109 Obviously, the Russian full records about the following meetings should be made publicly available:

a) April 13, 1953 (Stockholm). Meeting between Arne Lundberg, Cabinet Secretary at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, with Tarabrin, 1st Secretary at the Soviet Embassy110;
b) May 4, 1953 (Moscow). Meeting of the Swedish Ambassador Rolf Sohlman with Vladimir Semenov (head of the 3rd European Department, Soviet MID);
c) May 21, 1953 (Moscow). Second meeting of Sohlman with Semenov;
d) June 3, 1953 (Stockholm). Meeting of Östen Undén, Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister, with Konstantin Rodionov;
e) July 16, 1953 (Stockholm). Rodionov's statement that it was established that Wallenberg has not been and is not in the Soviet Union;
f) July 17, 1954 (Moscow). Undén's private conversations with Valerian Zorin, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, and Anastas Mikoyan, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister;

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110. In fact, Ye. A. Tarabrin was a foreign intelligence officer under a diplomatic cover. Later, from August 1956 to February 1963, Colonel Tarabrin headed the 2nd/3rd Department in charge of the Great Britain and, apparently, Scandinavian countries, of the 1st KGB Main Directorate (foreign intelligence) [Oleg Mozokhin, http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/kgb5491/structure/1GU/3.htm (in Russian)].
g) October 1, 1954 (Moscow). Sohlman hands a Swedish note over to Zorin. In the note, the Swedish side mentions Lavrentii Beria;

h) December 3, 1954 (Moscow). Sohlman’s meeting with Semenov, head of the 3rd European Department, MID);

i) December 26, 1954 (Moscow). One more meeting of Sohlman with Semenov;

j) May 17, 1955 (Stockholm). Meeting of Lundberg with Tarabrin, now former 1st secretary of the Soviet Embassy;

k) June 13, 1955 (Moscow). Meeting of the Swedish Riksdag delegation headed by Gustav Nilssen in the Kremlin with Kliment Voroshilov, Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Council Presidium, and other Soviet officials, including Gromyko;

l) November 8, 1955 (Stockholm). Undén provides Rodionov with detailed information on the statements about Wallenberg by the Germans released from Soviet captivity;

m) November 15, 1955 (Moscow). Second meeting of Sohlman with Bulganin;

n) December 18 (Moscow). Sohlman’s meeting with Semenov;

o) March 6, 1956 (Moscow). Meeting of Sohlman with Bulganin, Khrushchev, Semyonov and Tarabrin;

p) March 30, 1956 (Moscow). Talks between Soviet leaders Bulganin, Khrushchev, Molotov, and other officials, with the Swedish delegation that arrived in Moscow: Erlander, Prime Minister, Gunnar Hedlund, Interior Minister, Gunnar Jarring, head of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Ambasador Sohlman, and some others.

3. **Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE)**

1) Taking into consideration the numerous deals of the Wallenberg bank with the Soviet Union during the war, especially the ball-bearing trade which was negotiated by and organized with the help of head of the Trade Department of the Soviet Legation in Stockholm Mikhail Nikitin, there should be numerous documentation about the Wallenberg bankers and various trade deals in the archive of this ministry.

Secret deals involving Wallenberg business and Nazi authorities may have also been conducted in Hungary from 1944-45. For instance, in October 1944, the Swedish ball bearing firm SKF instructed its subsidiaries to transfer all European inventories to Nazi Germany, including its holdings in Budapest. Soviet officials sharply protested against these decisions and threatened to put the SKF Sales Director in Budapest on trial.112

Shortly after Wallenberg’s disappearance, the Swedish government received information via highly placed Hungarian intermediaries who claimed that the Soviets had arrested Wallenberg with the

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111. This archive contains at least part of the former USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade Archive. On April 4, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree stating that since that date on, the Russian federal archives that belong to the centralized *Rosarchiv* system, including the RGVE, RGASPI, GARF and RGVA, are under his personal control. See “Putin: *Rosarchiv* will be transferred under direct control by President.” TASS. April 4, 2016 (in Russian), http://tass.ru/politika/3174626.

possible intention of using him in a show trial, “together with other leading persons in trade and finance who allegedly aided German interests during the war.”

All these issues may have a direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg’s activities and possibly his fate. The relevant documents have never been made available for review.

2) There is information that Raoul Wallenberg himself, as a representative of his company Mellaneuropeiska, was involved in negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm in 1944. In his last message to Wallenberg in December 1944, his business partner Koloman Lauer mentioned a plan that from Budapest Wallenberg could perhaps go to Moscow for business negotiations. All these actions should be documented in the correspondence between the Trade Department of the Soviet Legation in Stockholm with Moscow. Although this archive responded in 1999 that it “contains no information on the activities of the diplomat Raoul Wallenberg”, this is not an answer to the activities of Wallenberg as a businessman.

All information regarding trade negotiations conducted with Mellaneuropeiska (including closely related firms) and the Soviet Legation (Trade Delegation), and especially Nikitin's office, for the year 1944 should be released.

4. MVD (Russian Interior Affairs Ministry) Archives

Apparently, records for former prisoners of Vladimir Prison exist also in the archives of the Interior Affairs Ministry (MVD) of the Russian Federation. From publications by FSB archivists, it became known that the Informational Center (Archive) of the Vladimir Region Interior Affairs Directorate (the Vladimir Region UVD) keeps files of prisoners of Vladimir Prison from the late 1940s-1950s. It is not clear if these files were separately created in this prison, or they are personal files of only Russian/Soviet prisoners. Some of the files were destroyed, but the archive keeps lists of those files. There are files of some foreigners in the archive, — at least those who died in Vladimir Prison (probably, Fond/Collection 10). All these files have never been requested by the Swedish-Russian Working Group.

1) The MVD Central Archive in Moscow should present a list of the existing and destroyed files.

2) As already mentioned, in March 1948, special commissions in Moscow (Central Commission), Soviet republics and local regions, as well as in the centers of labor camps were organized to select those prisoners who would be transferred to the special prisons and camps. These commissions included high-level representatives of the MVD, MGB, and prosecutor offices. The Central Commission

113. The information was conveyed by the Hungarian National Bank President Takácsy who served at the will of the Soviet occupation powers. Archives of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, P2 Eu 1. Raoul Wallenberg case file. Report by Kálmán Lauer (Raoul Wallenberg's business partner in Mellaneuropeiska) to Birger Ekeberg, September 1945.


in Moscow was chaired by Vassili Ryasnoi, MVD Deputy Minister who supervised, in particular, the MVD Prison Directorate.

If to suggest that Raoul Wallenberg and/or Vilmos Langfelder were convicted in 1947-first part of 1948, and were sent to a MVD punishment prison or labor camp, their cases were also evaluated by one of these commissions – most probably, by the Central Commission, and the records about this evaluation should have been kept in the materials of the MVD Prison Directorate or the 1st MVD Special Department (registration and statistics).

Materials of the Central Commission should be checked for Wallenberg and/or Langfelder documents in the MVD archival collections.

3) In March 1951, all convicted foreigners kept in the labor camps, special camps and MVD prisons were registered. The 1st MVD Special Department was in charge of this registration.

The MVD Central Archive should present materials of this registration for inspection or provide information what archives these files were moved to for checking if Wallenberg and Langfelder were kept in 1951 in any MVD facility for convicted prisoners.

4) The Informational Center of the Vladimir Region UVD should provide an opportunity for independent researchers to study the file of Konstantin Ordzhonikidze which, possibly, contains some information about an assignment of numbers to special prisoners in Vladimir Prison.

5) If this collection contains also files of foreign prisoners, the files of persons connected to the Wallenberg Case, including Paul-Erhard Hille, Ernst Huber, Horst Kitschmann, Jan Loyda, Ero Pelkonen, Gustav Richter, and Reiner Stahel, should be inspected by independent researchers.

6) If this collection contains Personal File of Ernst Krafft, who died in Vladimir Prison on July 23, 1954, it should be studied. It should be checked if Krafft, who in 1947 shared a cell with Langfelder in Lefortovo Prison, was called for an interrogation on the night of July 22/23, 1947.

7) If numerous correspondence between the MGB Prison Department with the Ivanovo NKGB/MGB branch and then Vladimir Prison regarding the numbered prisoners is kept in this collection of the Informational Center of the Vladimir Region UVD, it should be also inspected.

8) If this archive contains documentation on the arrival of prisoners, the names of prisoners transferred in May 1952 should be checked for possible identification of the Hungarian Prisoner no. 1 (b. 1909).

5. Presidential Archive (AP RF)

1) An analysis of the list of names of persons who attended the Politburo meeting in Stalin’s office on August 9, 1947 shows that, most probably, the Vyshinsky Note (and, possibly, the whole Wallenberg Case) was discussed at this meeting, when Abakumov was in Stalin’s office from 23:00 to 23:30.\textsuperscript{117} Before him, Vyshinsky was in Stalin’s office from 22:10-22:50. However, only on 12 August a Politburo decision regarding the MGB appeared in the Politburo records (P59/123). Additionally, copies of the final version of the Vyshinsky Note were sent to all attendees of this meeting, including Abakumov, plus Molotov and Anastas Mikoyan, Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, who were absent at the meeting. Such decisions were filed in the MGB Special Folder of the Politburo which is still classified. Mikoyan’s name on the list of recipients of the note directly points to the involvement of the Foreign Trade Ministry in the Wallenberg case.

All records on this meeting should be released.

2) There is direct evidence in MID’s documents that Stalin’s personal secretariat, called the Special Sector of the Central Committee, dealt with the Wallenberg case. On December 11, 1947, A. I. Kabashkin, head of the 5th Section (letters) of the Special Sector sent a Swedish letter, addressed to Stalin, to MID for MID’s comments.\textsuperscript{118}

Therefore, the archive of the Special Sector should be checked for documents about Wallenberg.

3) Other MGB folders kept in the Presidential Archive, especially correspondence of the Soviet leaders involved in the case — Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, Lavrentii Beria (NKVD Commissar until December 1945) with the MGB, — also need attention of researchers. They have never been declassified.

6. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI)

Part of some collections of documents from Stalin’s time had been moved from the AP RF to the RGASPI, and some files from those parts have been declassified, especially in 2007, 2014-1015.

Two collections, of V. M. Molotov (Fond/Collection 82) and A. I. Mikoyan (Fond/Collection 84) should be checked. Molotov’s collection should be checked for materials on Raoul Wallenberg and his case, as well as on the Wallenberg brothers. Mikoyan’s collection should be checked for materials on any trade negotiations and agreements between the Soviet Foreign Trade Commissariat/Ministry and Swedish


\textsuperscript{118. Cited in the so-called “Memorandum on the Wallenberg Case”, 1952, p. 10. The “Memorandum” was signed by Andrei Plakhin, at the time acting head of the 5th European Department of MID, and sent to the Politburo. The “Memorandum” was released in 1991 from the AVP RF (former MID Archive).}
companies, including negotiations about ball bearings with the SKF, with Raoul Wallenberg’s company Mellaneuropeiska in Stockholm, and about the trade agreements of 1940 and 1946.

It is necessary to remember that those collections are only partly declassified.

7. Russian Federation State Archive (GARF)

1) As already mentioned, materials for Zigurds Krumins, including his Archival-Investigation File, need to be examined.

2) Materials of the NKVD/MVD Prison Directorate (Fond/Collection R-9413) need to be examined to check if any order regarding Raul Wallenberg and/or Vilmos Langfelder was issued in 1947-48 – in case if they survived after July 1947, were convicted and sent to a prison or a labor camp (in 1947, special prisons were still within the MVD system, they were transferred to the MGB in 1949).

3) Also, since Fond/Collection R-9413 (Opis'/Register 1) contains materials about many aspects of prisons and their administration, as well as, apparently, the numbered prisoners in Vladimir Prison, this collection for the 1946-49 years should be carefully checked, in particular, for better understanding of the system of assigning numbers to convicted prisoners.119

8. Additional Issues That Need to Be Reviewed in Some particular Archives

Here are some examples:

1) It needs to be established how, when and where exactly Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder were moved from Budapest to Moscow in January 1945, before their arrival in Lubyanka Prison on February 6, 1945.

2) In the years 1945-47, Soviet diplomats appeared to signal a possible willingness of the Soviet government to make an exchange for Raoul Wallenberg, for Soviet citizens detained in Sweden. It needs to be established what instructions, if any, these diplomats received from their superiors in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Soviet leadership.

3) It needs to be determined if Marcus Wallenberg wrote a second letter to Ambassador Kollontay. Marcus Wallenberg’s letter to Alexandra Kollontay from April 23, 1945 appears to be the only letter he sent to her. By that time, Kollontay had left Stockholm and the letter was taken to Moscow personally by Bengt Åkerren, Swedish Military Attaché to Moscow.120 Kollontay’s response came only more than one year later, on June 7, 1946.

119. Apparently, some of these materials were made available to the consultant to the Swedish Working Group, Susan E. Mesinai, on special request by the Chairman of the Swedish side, Hans Magnusson.

It should be checked, if there was any additional correspondence between these two persons since Staffan Söderblom, Swedish Minister to Moscow, stated on June 11, 1946, when he forwarded Kollontay’s letter to Stockholm: “In the matter concerning Raoul Wallenberg’s disappearance I carried with me after my last visit home a letter from Marcus Wallenberg, Jr., written on my suggestion, to Mrs. Kollontai.”121 In fact, it was Åkerren, not Söderblom, who carried Marcus Wallenberg’s original letter. Söderblom visited Stockholm on several occasions after April 1945, including in May 1946. He returned to Moscow on May 23rd.

Marcus Wallenberg’s second letter should be released, as should any additional letter(s) by Alexandra Kollontay that are part of this exchange.

4) In 1945, Alexandra Kollontay apparently told Ingrid Günther, wife of the Swedish Foreign Minister, that Raoul had committed "a foolish thing" while in Budapest.122

It remains unclear what Kollontay was referring to specifically.

5) The details of the discussions between the Swedish physician Dr. Nanna Svartz and Soviet Academician Aleksandr Myasnikov from 1961 to 1965, when Dr. Svartz understood that Dr. Myasnikov claimed that Wallenberg was still alive, should be reviewed in full. Unfortunately, Myasnikov’s memoir published in 2011, does not throw any additional light on the issue.123

6) Myasnikov’s personal papers were requested for a review, but the request was denied. The Myasnikov-Svartz contacts were discussed at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership, including the Central Committee’s Presidium (former Politburo). Only very few documents have been released. Such a review could clarify if Soviet officials had precise information what transpired in the Myasnikov-Svartz conversation, if Myasnikov was reprimanded, or if he ever had been involved in the medical treatment of foreign prisoners.

A second physician, Dr. Grigory Danishevsky, was also present during Myasnikov's meeting with Svartz in 1961, yet no information about his role or his statements has been released. Full access to all documentation related to the Myasnikov-Svartz discussions should be provided.

7) In May 1965, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party approved an official reply to Dr. Svartz. The notations on the document show that the Myasnikov/Svartz issue was also discussed by a full session of the Politburo.

The full documentation that was preparatory to this meeting should be released.

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121. Ibid.
8) In June 1963, Stig Wennerström, a Swedish Air Force Colonel, was arrested as a Soviet spy. The subsequent behind-the-scenes discussions, via East Germany, allegedly about using his arrest to press for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg, should be clarified.

All documentation related to the contacts between Wolfgang Vogel and Carl Gustav Svingel, from one side, and Soviet representatives in the negotiations, from another, should be released.

9) The meeting in 1965 between Tage Erlander, Swedish Prime Minister, and Aleksei Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister, which led to the official closure of the Raoul Wallenberg case until 1979, requires further evaluation.

What exactly did Kosygin tell Tage Erlander about the Raoul Wallenberg case? And what exactly did Kosygin know about Raoul Wallenberg’s fate?

This documentation should be released in full.

10) Only partial records of discussions at the Politburo meetings that preceded Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s invitation to Moscow of Raoul Wallenberg’s relatives in 1989 have been released so far.

This documentation should be released in full.

11) In 1952, Stalin ordered the preparation of a number of show trials in Hungary, in which several former associates of Raoul Wallenberg were to have been charged with having conspired to kill the Swedish diplomat in the cellar of the American Embassy in Budapest in 1945. A special group of MGB officers was sent to Hungary to oversee the preparations for this trial, yet no documentation or reports of their activities have been released from Russian archives.

This information could well shed light on how Soviet officials viewed the Wallenberg Case seven years after his disappearance and five years after his alleged death. Heinrich Grosheim-Krisko testified that in 1945 Soviet interrogators in Budapest repeatedly asked him about an "anti-Soviet spy center" which allegedly was to be created at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, to provide information during the upcoming Soviet occupation of Hungary. Soviet officials were particularly interested in Raoul Wallenberg's activities in this regard.124

Soviet documentation on the planned trials and activity of Soviet advisers in charge of the preparation of the trials should be released in full.

12) In the years 1945-1947, Soviet diplomats appeared to signal a possible willingness of the Soviet leadership to link the case of Raoul Wallenberg with the cases of a number of Soviet citizens detained in Sweden.

It needs to be established what instructions, if any, these diplomats received from their superiors in the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissariat/Ministry and from the Soviet leadership.

13) In February 1983, the Swedish judge Gunnar Linnander reported that he had met an Englishman in Geneva who reported that Raoul Wallenberg had died just a few weeks earlier, in a ‘dacha’ outside of Moscow. As a source for this information, he named a Norwegian businessman and arms dealer by the name of Erik Bjertnes.

Bjertnes explained that his source was an old acquaintance of his from wartime Stockholm, Alexander Pavlov. According to Bjertnes, Alexander Pavlov was the son of the famous translator Pavlov who had translated for high ranking Soviet officials, including Stalin. Despite repeated requests to identify Pavlov and to provide information about him, the Russian side has provided no details. A Soviet representative by the name of Alexander Pavlov had been stationed in Stockholm during the war where he had worked for the Soviet news agency TASS. He was a known GRU agent.

Bjertnes had close contacts with Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontay in Stockholm. The possible transfer of information about Raoul Wallenberg through these old established channels should be researched further.

The true identity of Alexander Pavlov needs to be determined.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

In order to be able to draw any valid conclusions about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg in MGB hands, researchers must be allowed to review original documents and in the context of the archival files.

The possible reasons for Wallenberg’s arrest and why he was not released are of central importance. It needs to be determined what exactly Soviet secret services knew about his business, political and, possibly, intelligence contacts in Sweden and Hungary during the years 1941-45.

In order to assist professional researchers and historians in their efforts, Swedish officials should continue to remind Russian authorities of their stated commitment to provide independent professional historians with full access to the necessary archival materials.

The right of victims of enforced disappearance and their families to the truth about their ordeal is internationally recognized. Insistence on this legal principle underscores the fact that aside from the many honors the world has bestowed on Raoul Wallenberg, he, like the millions of other victims of political repression, deserves something more. He deserves justice.