

THE FATE OF RAOUL WALLENBERG:  
GAPS IN OUR CURRENT KNOWLEDGE

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Paper presented at the international conference sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History of the Russian Academy of Science, "Raoul Wallenberg, a 20th Century Hero"

May 28, 2012      Moscow



Raoul Wallenberg's photo on a visa application he filed in June 1943 with the Hungarian Legation, Stockholm; courtesy of the Hungarian National Archives, Budapest.

The story of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish businessman who went to Hungary in 1944 to rescue the Jews of Budapest, bears all the hallmarks of a Greek tragedy: young and idealistic, he fought one totalitarian regime (Nazism) only to fall victim to another (Stalinism). His case seamlessly links the two defining events of the 20th Century, the Holocaust and the Cold War. The full circumstances of his fate after July 23, 1947 — the last confirmed date of his presence in the Soviet prison system — have never been established and the search for him continues.

The date July 23, 1947 was established as a result of a series of inquiries we put to the FSB Central Archive. For a while, the FSB archivists kindly responded to many of our questions, but some important requests have remain unanswered. Other critical gaps exist in the materials provided by the Russian side during the official search for Raoul Wallenberg by the Swedish-Russian working group in 1991-2001. In fact, several important archives were not even touched. Below we summarize some of these gaps that, in our opinion, are relevant to the investigation of the case. Without filling these archival gaps, the questions why Wallenberg was arrested and what happened to him after July 23, 1947 will remain unanswered.

## **I. FSB Archival Materials**

During the last four years, we have been focusing our requests on documentation that can reasonably serve to advance the still unsolved question of what exactly happened to Raoul Wallenberg in Soviet captivity. This includes questions about his personal background and activities in Hungary which have so far remained unexplored but which could prove helpful for our investigation.

We have requested documentation we know exists in Russian archives, but that for one or another reason we have not been allowed to review.

And wherever possible, we asked for direct access to original documents, not copies. In light of recent disclosures, it is clear that our concern about the edited or censored documentation we have often been restricted to is well founded.

### **1. Interrogation Registers and Prisoner No. 7**

#### **1) Facts**

We have repeatedly asked for full information about the interrogations of prisoners who knew about Raoul Wallenberg and his driver Vilmos Langfelder in two MGB investigation prisons, Lubyanka and Lefortovo, on the night of July 22/23, 1947—an event that is crucial for the case.

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№ п/п по порядку	ФАМИЛИИ И ИНИЦИАЛЫ АРЕСТОВАННЫХ	Фамилия вызывающего на допрос	Наим. отд. №№ ком.	Время убытия ар-вца на допр.		Время прибытия ар-вца с допр.		Расписка арестованного по прибытии с допроса
				час	мин	час	мин	
68								
69								
70								
71	Лангфельдер	Корниженко	3/662	2	15	18	50	Лангфельдер
72	Катона	Корниженко	3/662	2	35	18	30	Катона
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In November 2009, in reply to our request, FSB archivists confirmed the previously known two interrogations for Wallenberg's long-term cellmate Willy Rödel on July 22, 1947. However, surprisingly they also stated that a "Prisoner No. 7" had been part of the special interrogation line-up of prisoners on July 23, 1947 who had direct connection with the Wallenberg case and who were all questioned during that fateful night.

In fact, it was Russian officials who came to the conclusion that "Prisoner No. 7" in "great likelihood" is identical with Raoul Wallenberg. They based their conclusion on circumstantial evidence, especially the fact that both "Prisoner No. 7" and Willy Rödel were questioned on July 22, 1947, thereby

excluding the possibility that "Prisoner No. 7" could be identical with Rödel. If confirmed, this finding would constitute the first ever proof that Raoul Wallenberg was alive six days after the official Soviet claim of his death on July 17, 1947 in Lubyanka Prison.

FSB officials released only a censored copy of the Lubyanka interrogation registers for July 22 and 23, 1947, showing the names of just two prisoners: Langfelder and Sandor Katona, a Hungarian citizen arrested in September 1944 in Sofia. Katona appears to have been Langfelder's cellmate.

Our requests for clarification and further information about "Prisoner No. 7" have so far remained unanswered. Two letters written by Swedish Ambassador Tomas Bertelman to the FSB archives from December 2009 and March 2011 have also received no response.

We have repeatedly requested full page, uncensored copies of all prison register pages from Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons mentioning Wallenberg/Langfelder as well as "Prisoner No. 7". These requests so far have not been met. In response to this failure,

we have asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry to take up this issue in an official way with Russian authorities. So far, no formal answer to these inquiries has been received.

Another “Prisoner No. 7”, who is noted in the Lubyanka Prison Interrogation register in April 1945, was identified in 2001 by a member of the FSB administration and a member of the Swedish-Russian working group, Colonel Konstantin Vinogradov, as “a Russian citizen”. This “Prisoner No. 7” was called to an interrogation on the same day as Wallenberg and could therefore clearly not be identical with him. FSB archivists claim that the identification of this prisoner was made on the basis of entries in the Lubyanka Prison Register. This is not possible, since the registries contain no information about a prisoner’s citizenship. We are still waiting for information how Colonel Vinogradov identified the citizenship of that prisoner and if this methodology can be applied also to the “Prisoner No. 7” from 1947.

Our request for a disclosure of the procedure of providing a MGB prisoner under investigation with a number remained unanswered. It is unclear if the FSB still possesses old instructions for the investigation process. However, in 1991 when the Swedish-Russian working group started its activity, a lot of old SMERSH/MGB investigators (Daniil Kopelyansky, Boris Solovov, Pavel Grishaev, Nikolai Mesyatsev among others) were still alive and could release such information.

In May 2012, the FSB archivists stated that “there is no way for confirming or denying the fact that Wallenberg was the so-called ‘numbered prisoner’, i.e., ‘Prisoner No. 7’, on the basis of documents.” Therefore, the whole issue of “Prisoner No. 7”— if this was Raoul Wallenberg and if he was alive after July 17, 1947— remains unsolved and, according to the FSB, cannot be solved.

## 2) The Mystery of the Word “Proshel”

There is also a strange detail in the released censored page. Instead of personal signatures of prisoners in the last column that, according to the rules, should have been in the last column, one can see what looks like a signature, like “Proshin”, or a Russian word that could be interpreted as “Proshel” meaning “Went through.” The FSB archivists insist on the last interpretation, but refuse to show the original or make a copy of the full page. Our request to provide us with copies of other examples of records with the same word “Proshel” to illustrate that such a form of registration existed was rejected so far. FSB archivists confirmed that the entry for “Prisoner Nr. 7” for July 23, 1947 is also signed the same way, but did not provide a copy of the entry.

In the last answer to us in May 2012 the FSB stated that the release of copies of pages from the register, “where in the column ‘signing of the arrestee after coming from an interrogation’ there is a note ‘proshel’ for third persons is not stipulated by the Russian legislation.” Regrettably, the archivists did not clarify this phrase and what law they meant. This answer closes an opportunity to independently inspect and verify FSB information about the lists of the arrestees interrogated during both nights of July 22 and July 23, 1947, which is of central importance for the Wallenberg case.

If the word is, in fact, “proshel” (went through), it apparently indicates that the prisoners at this time were still alive. According to entries in the Lubyanka register of prisoner possessions, Langfelder claimed his personal belongings the day after the July 23, 1947 interrogation, suggesting that he was about to leave Lubyanka prison. It has been impossible to confirm if Raoul Wallenberg and Katona did the same.

Our repeated requests to make uncensored copies of the records also for the previous evening, July 22, 1947 in both prisons, Lefortovo and Lubyanka and to show us original records were denied.

Therefore, so far it remains unclear from where FSB officials obtained the information about Prisoner No. 7 and his interrogations on July 22 and July 23 in Lubyanka prison.

The release of this crucial piece of information — whether contained in the Lubyanka Prison register or in another source — nearly twenty years after the Swedish-Russian Working Group began its official work raises many important questions. It suggests that Russian officials chose to intentionally withhold this detail from the Swedish members of the Working Group in 1991. The reasons for this decision need to be examined further.

### 3) Consequences

If “Prisoner No. 7” is indeed listed on the page for July 23, 1947, it emphasizes the fact that Russian censorship of records is not innocuous or designed primarily to protect arcane secrecy/privacy rules, but instead serves to prevent investigators to learn key facts in the Wallenberg case. By implication, all other censorship we have encountered during and after the work of the Working Group must be viewed and reexamined in this light.

It raises especially interesting questions about the letter written by Minister of State Security Viktor Abakumov to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov on July 17, 1947, the content of which has never been released. Researchers now have to wonder whether the letter is truly missing or has been intentionally withheld because its contents do not

reflect the official version provided by Soviet and Russian authorities about what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, namely that he died on July 17, 1947? If he was alive six days later, Abakumov could not have reported Raoul Wallenberg's death on July 17, 1947.

A similar problem arises with the letter of a certain Shiryagin from Ukraine who wrote to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) in 1953. In the letter he stated that he had important information about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Mikhail Gribanov, at the time head of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Department of MID, forwarded the letter to the KGB officials with a request to ensure that Shiryagin stop talking about Wallenberg, so that Swedish officials would not hear about the matter. The Swedish-Russian Working Group tried hard to locate both Shiryagin and his letter but was unsuccessful.

The question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains currently unsolved. He may have been murdered in July 1947 or shortly afterwards. However, there is still the possibility that he could have remained under investigation for some time in MGB investigation prisons in Moscow. It also is possible that he was eventually sentenced and sent away from Moscow. If a free access to Moscow prison registers of arrivals and departures of prisoners was available to independent researchers, all these questions would have been possibly solved long time ago.

#### 4) Additional Data That Need Clarification

The 2001 report of the Russian part of the Working Group (available at [www.regeringen.se](http://www.regeringen.se) and [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru)) contains a statement by the former KGB official Colonel A. V. Bachurin, who headed the KGB press bureau in the 1960's. At some point — apparently around 1956, the time of the preparation of the Andrei Gromyko Memorandum of 1957 — Bachurin was involved in writing a KGB reply to one of the Russian Foreign Ministry's inquiries about the cause of Wallenberg's death.

Bachurin claimed that "the [KGB] leadership at the time did not want to tell the real cause of death of the Swedish diplomat." This statement implies that the KGB at the time had knowledge of Wallenberg's death as well as how he died. However, the comment needs to be checked further. In what context and to whom was this statement made? Did Bachurin have full knowledge of the Raoul Wallenberg case? Did Bachurin's KGB colleagues reveal how Wallenberg died and when? And if so, is this knowledge persevered today?

## 2. Medical Records

During a press conference in January 2001, Colonel Vinogradov cited a reference to a medical registry that supposedly showed that Raoul Wallenberg had asked for medical assistance once, when he requested an appointment with a dentist. The actual register entry has never been presented by the FSB despite numerous inquiries. Russian officials stated that the information had been provided by the above-mentioned official Bachurin.

During an interview by the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 1993, Mr. Bachurin indicated that Wallenberg's request occurred "either in Butyrka or Lefortovo." The FSB informed us that medical registers are not available in its archives for Butyrka Prison (the records exist only after 1947), as well as for Sukhanovo and Vladimir prisons, and they supposedly did not survive for Lubyanka and Lefortovo. Mr. Bachurin died in 2004. Obviously, the issue of medical registers of MGB prisons remains an open question, as does the question about how Mr. Bachurin learned of Raoul Wallenberg's request.

### **3. Question about the OSO Lists of Names**

Since 2001 we have filed numerous requests regarding prisoners sentenced by the MGB Special Board (OSO). The FSB has repeatedly answered that neither Raoul Wallenberg, nor Vilmos Langfelder were formally charged or sentenced for any crime and that they are not listed in the materials of the OSO. However, this information requires verification by independent researchers.

The FSB consistently denied access to the OSO original materials referring to the state secrecy restrictions. Our requests to release copies of the lists of prisoners sentenced by OSO for specific years were also rejected.

### **4. Wallenberg's and Langfelder's Possessions**

One of the crucial questions regarding Wallenberg has never been answered: How and particularly where did the FSB archivists manage to find Wallenberg's valuables, money and other possessions in 1989 supposedly without archival records?

We know that the system of recording possessions was quite elaborate, with giving the prisoner separate receipts for the money and for the other valuables. How could such items be found without corresponding archival records?

And it would be extremely unusual if Wallenberg's diary that was also released in 1989 had been kept along with the valuables. Usually such documentation was part of the



materials in the Investigation File. Therefore, the origin of this diary also remains a mystery.

The same question applies to a copy of a receipt for and a list of Langlelder's possessions, as well as a list of Katona's possessions. The FSB archivists have never clearly explained what type of file these copies of these documents came from (they have almost sequential page numbers, 151 for Katona and 154-155 for Langfelder) and why there was no similar documents for Wallenberg. Possibly, it would become more clear if the FSB showed independent researchers the original file with Langfelder and Katona's receipts.

## **5. The Smoltsov Report**

The FSB Archive has never answered the question that is pending for 55 years: From what exact archival file did the so-called Smoltsov Report addressed to the MGB Minister Abakumov originate? This report stated that Wallenberg had died of "a heart attack" on July 17, 1947. The report was cited in the Soviet diplomatic memorandum, presented by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko in February 1957. In the 1990s, the original document, kept outside of its original file, was inspected by the Russian and Swedish criminology experts, as well as archivists of the Moscow Memorial Society, and all of them concluded that the document is authentic.

Currently, after the FSB archivists stated that "Prisoner No. 7" was, most probably, Wallenberg, who was interrogated five days after the date of his death in Smoltsov's Report, it is hard to overestimate the necessity of information about the original file of Smoltsov's Report and the precise time of its finding.

The records regarding the employment of A. L. Smoltsov, head of the Medical Department of Lubyanka Prison, during the crucial summer of 1947, when he was, in fact, on medical leave from his post in prison, are of particular interest. This information has been requested by various researchers on numerous occasions, but there is not still answer to these inquiries.

## **6. The File of Willy Rödel**

For many years we repeatedly asked the FSB Central Archive about the file of Wallenberg's longtime cellmate, Willy Rödel:

- 1) To show us the original collection/file from which the few documents about Rödel that had been previously released supposedly originate. Russian officials indicated that this documentation is kept in a so-called "operative correspondence file" (PF-9653) that

contains correspondence between prison officials and security organs about imprisoned foreign diplomats, The FSB would not allow us to inspect the material.

2) The FSB did allow us to inspect a few pages that were released to the Swedish side of the Working Group (medical documents regarding Rödel's death) as copies without page numbers. The archivists finally informed us about the page numbers, but never allowed us to inspect the originals.

FSB archivists claimed for years that the this file contained no further information about Rödel than that which had been previously released and that none of Rödel's interrogation documents could be located.

In November 2009 the FSB officials suddenly informed us that, in fact, some of Rödel's interrogations existed. Two of Roedel's statements to his interrogators were published in Russian in 2011 in the book *Secrets of the Third Reich Diplomacy: German Diplomats, Leaders of Foreign Military Missions, Military Policemen and Police Attaches in Soviet Captivity. Documents from Investigation Files. 1944-1955*, edited by Vasillii Khristoforov, head of the FSB Directorate for Registration and Archival Collections (Moscow: Demokratiya Publ.) This seems to indicate that large parts of Willy Rödel's file have indeed survived. This raises the important question whether similar documents have been preserved for other prisoners closely connected to the Wallenberg case, including Wallenberg himself.

Rödel's file is especially significant because, as Nikita Petrov of Moscow Memorial has discovered, it belongs to a group of files of the liquidated (secretly executed) persons [Nikita Petrov, *Pervyi predsedatel' KGB Ivan Serov* (Moscow: Materik, 2005), p. 158]. According to Colonel Vinogradov, the same collection contains materials of the case of former Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen who died in the Butyrka Prison Hospital in 1946.

It is worth noting that the last page number in Rödel's file is written on an envelope that contains, among other things, his prisoner card and diplomatic passport. This fact raises the question whether Raoul Wallenberg's prisoner card and diplomatic passport were located in a similar collection of documents.

Rödel's documents should be made available for review for a simple reason that a long-time Wallenbergs's cellmate was executed on October 15, 1947, a few months after Wallenberg's disappearance after July 23, 1947. The documentation could provide important clues about how sensitive cases like his and that of Raoul Wallenberg were handled by the Soviet security apparatus at the time.

In May 2012, the FSB informed us that in May/June 2012 it will publish a compilation of documents entitled *SA Oberfuhrer Willy Roedel: Documents from the FSB Archives of Russia*, edited by Vasili Khristoforov. From the FSB phrasing it is unclear if all Rödel's archival documents will be included in this publication.

A review conducted in 1993 of a two-volume report of a special Commission headed by Nikolai Arzhannikov – who was deputy chair of the Committee of Human Rights at the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation – showed that Rödel's file apparently included an important document in the Wallenberg case, a copy of the Vyshinsky Note dated August 18, 1947. This note stated that "Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and he is not known to us. It remains only to assume that Wallenberg was killed or captured by Hungarian Nazis."

Today the FSB claims that the file PF-9653 (which contains Rödel's file) does not include such a copy of the Vyshinsky Note. However, the review in 1993 suggests that this particular copy originated from Rödel's file. It carries Abakumov's handwritten instruction "Comrade Kartashov should be acquainted with this." Sergei Kartashov headed the MGB investigation department that held both Wallenberg and Rödel.

The placement of a copy of the Vyshinsky Note (only 14 copies were typed originally for the highest Soviet leaders) in Rödel's file in August 1947 would underscore the close link between his and Wallenberg's case. Unfortunately, Arzhannikov's collection of documents is currently unavailable to independent researchers for a review.

## **7. Archival-Investigation Files and Operational Materials**

Clearly, without examining the Archival-Investigation files of such prisoners as Hermann Grossheim-Krysko (Tomsen), who worked at the Swedish Legation in Budapest in 1944 and who was interrogated about Wallenberg many times, of the cell mates of Wallenberg and Langfelder like Gustav Richter, Horst Kitschmann and Franz Rudolf Gfrorener, as well as known cell spies as Hans Loyda, Erhard Hille, and Walter Schlitter-Scheuer (Schlueter), the study of the Wallenberg case cannot be considered complete.

However, the FSB Archives have so far not allowed independent researchers to study these files. Although we have a notarized permission from Willy Rödel's son to study all archival materials of his father on his behalf, the FSB refused to grant us access to these documents. It should be possible to arrive at some kind of arrangement to ensure that researchers can review operational files of prisoners placed with Wallenberg and Langfelder that might contain highly relevant information.

## **8. Transcripts of Interrogations or Debriefings of Wallenberg's Colleagues**

It is known that from January to April 1945, members of the Swedish Legation, including Envoy Ivan Danielsson, were detained by SMERSH separately from Raoul Wallenberg. Later they were sent to Sweden via Moscow. So far, the FSB Archive released only one censored (without one page) transcript of a debriefing of this group of diplomats (a report by Mukhortov, deputy head of the SMERSH Directorate of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ukrainian Front). These materials should also include Danielsson's discussions in March 1945 with Soviet General Pavlov's headquarters which specifically dealt with the work of the Swedish Legation, Budapest. It is important to determine what exactly Danielsson and the other Swedish representative told Soviet officials not only about the Legation's actions but also about the work of Raoul Wallenberg.

We asked the FSB to release the missing page of Mukhortov's report and to continue the search for other documents of these debriefings, and we are waiting for their results. Since there was also correspondence between SMERSH and NKID about these detainees, additional inquiries will be made in the Archives of Foreign Policy (MID's archive).

## **9. Materials of the MGB Department "A" (registration and archive) and Prison Department**

1) The report of the Russian part of the Working Group states: "As the later [archival] studies showed, the MGB Department "A", responsible for the registration of the arrestees, in response to inquiries from operational MGB departments provided them with information that the diplomat [Wallenberg] was kept in custody of military counterintelligence 'Smersh.'" Such notes of the MGB Department "A" have never been released.

2) If Wallenberg, Langfelder and/or Katona survived after July 1947 and were possibly convicted and sent to a prison or a labor camp, there should be two types of archival records:

a) Records in the Prison Department about issuing a "Naryad" (an order) for each of these prisoners for sending them to a particular prison or a labor camp;

b) Records in the same department about receiving a special registration card of the "Form 1" for each of these prisoners after they had reached the destination of their imprisonment.

The FSB Archive has never stated that it specifically checked these two types of records for the period from the end of July 1947 (after the July 23, 1947 interrogation)

until mid-1951, when former cell mates of Wallenberg and Langfelder had been sentenced and sent to Vladimir Prison.

3) Apparently, documentation in the Department "A" or Prison Department should also specify if prisoners under discussion were at that time registered under their own names or if they were assigned a number or, possibly, an alias name.

4) It also needs to be established if the MGB Prison Department received regular reports from the heads of MGB prisons with detailed information about the prisoner population for specific years, including a statistical breakdown of prisoners by nationality. Such statistics would provide important information about the presence of Swedish prisoners in specific prisons in specific years.

The question of what happened to Raoul Wallenberg remains currently unsolved. He may well have been murdered in July 1947 or shortly afterwards. However, there is still a possibility that he could have remained under investigation for some time in MGB investigation prisons in Moscow. It is also possible that Wallenberg was eventually sentenced and sent away from Moscow. With a free access to Moscow prison registers of arrivals and departures of prisoners and materials of the MGB Prison and "A" departments all these questions would have been solved long time ago.

An unanswered question about the procedure of numbering particular prisoners in Vladimir Prison from 1947 to 1952 is pending from 1990, when members of the first International Wallenberg Commission discovered prisoner cards with numbers at the archive of this prison. Additionally, important questions remain about at least one unknown Swedish prisoner in Vladimir Prison after July 1947, whom Russian authorities have so far failed to identify.

## II. SVR Archives

Since 2001 we have repeatedly requested partial access to the following files:

1) Reports and other communications from the *rezidentura* at the Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, regarding Raoul Wallenberg, including his early contacts with prominent political figures, such as the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm, Dr. Antal Ullein-Reviczky, his appointment to the Swedish Legation, Budapest in 1944 and his disappearance. Such records would provide important information about what exactly Soviet authorities knew about Raoul Wallenberg and how they assessed his contacts.

2) Intelligence reports from Hungary 1944-1945. These records remain essentially entirely off limits. Colonel Igor Prelin, at the time head of the KGB press service, stated on numerous occasions that the Soviet Security Services had important foreign

intelligence sources in Hungary. This material has been repeatedly requested. In 2007, we filed a detailed request concerning reports by Soviet field agents about the activities of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish Legation, including interviews conducted with Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic colleagues in March 1945 (as mentioned above). We also requested specific information about the activities of the Hungarian resistance movement with whom both Wallenberg and his Swedish colleagues maintained close contact. The access was denied because this documentation remains classified.

3) Operational and/or Personal File of Mikhail Kutuzov-Tolstoy (for information regarding Raoul Wallenberg and his work at the Swedish Legation, Budapest, in 1944). The SVR replies varied from that his file is not located in Moscow to that it cannot be reviewed due to national security concerns. Similar answers were received from FSB archivists. However, former head of the Special (now Military) Archive in Moscow, Anatolii Prokopenko, claims that he has seen Kutusov-Tolstoy's file in 1991 in a KGB archive outside of Moscow. The problem remains currently unresolved.

#### 4) Records concerning the Wallenberg Family and Raoul Wallenberg

The access to Soviet intelligence reports concerning members of the Wallenberg Family (especially bankers Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg), as well as Raoul Wallenberg, have been consistently denied since 2001, even though it has been established that there exists such a collection. This documentation could provide important leads to understand why Stalin decided to arrest Raoul Wallenberg, as well as offer clues about how the case information was handled in the Soviet bureaucracy.

The fact that Boris Rybkin, foreign intelligence *resident* at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm of the time was in charge of paying the Wallenberg's Enskilda Bank in 1943 with platinum for ball bearing shipments to the Soviet Union is described in open memoirs; the American Allies even offered to transport the ball bearings from Sweden to the Soviet Union. Most probably, Rybkin's subordinate Igor Spichkin, also a NKVD/NKGB officer, was involved in the ball bearing payment. All these activities must have been reflected in reports to Moscow which currently should be kept in the SVR Archive.

In 2007, we additionally asked for information regarding Jacob Wallenberg's approach to the Soviet government through intermediaries in Czechoslovakia in 1954, regarding Raoul Wallenberg. SVR's reply stated that no information about this initiative is available.

5) As historian Craig McKay has pointed out, in her memoirs Nina Langlet claims that in 1945 the same NKGB officer Igor Spichkin was a member of the Soviet part of the Allied

Control Commission in Budapest and that he signed the document "announcing the departure of Swedish diplomatic personnel" in March 1945. Previously, in 1944, Nina Langlet, along with her husband Voldemar, was involved in saving Jews in Budapest under the protection of the Swedish Red Cross. This claim and Spichkin's supposed official function in Budapest after in 1945 needs to be clarified as well.

6) Our request to inspect the materials regarding contacts between the Soviet diplomat and foreign intelligence officer Pavel Erzin and the Finnish diplomat Åke Frey in 1955-1957 was denied. These discussions, conducted during the months before the release of the so-called Gromyko Memorandum in February 1957, unofficially confirmed for the first time that Wallenberg was in fact held prisoner in the Soviet Union. It is doubtful that the SVR archive does not have detailed records about these contacts since the discussions involved the highest level of Soviet decision makers, including the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey in 1956 and Secretary General of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Boris Podtserob.

### **III. Archives to Be Inquired About Specific Issues**

#### **1. Military Archives, the *Razvedupr* (RU, field military intelligence) information**

It is known that in 1944 the *Razvedupr* had a net of agents in Hungary and this organization participated in bringing Hungarian delegations for peace negotiations to Moscow and in the negotiations itself. After Wallenberg had been detained at the headquarters of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ukrainian Front, most probably he was debriefed not only by SMERSH (which is known), but also by military intelligence officers. There is a possibility that transcripts of these interrogations might provide some light on Wallenberg's detention and the arrest that followed. This information has never been requested or offered for review.

#### **2. Archive of the Political Directorate of the Red Army (apparently, also Military Archive)**

Among the documents the FSB released in 1991, there is a report of the head of the Political Department the 151<sup>st</sup> Division, Dmitrienko, to the Head of the Political Department of the 7<sup>th</sup> Army, on the detention of Wallenberg and Langfelder in the house No. 16 on the Benczur Street, dated January 14, 1945. This line of command was not pursued by the Swedish-Russian Working Group, only inquiries about Dmitrienko were made.

In the meantime, it is known that in the case of the above-mentioned Count Istvan Bethlen, who was detained approximately at the same time as Wallenberg,

interrogations by political officers were intense and there were detailed correspondence of field units with Moscow headquarters. This line is important because the Political Directorate was, in fact, not a part of the military command, but part of the Central Committee, and its head, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, was not only a Politburo candidate member, but also a deputy Defense Commissar, i.e., Stalin's deputy. Obviously, the archive of the Political Directorate should be checked for reports and debriefings of Wallenberg and Langfelder while they were detained in the military headquarters of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ukrainian Front.

In May 2012, the FSB stated that except Dmitrienko's report, "there is no additional documents in the FSB Central Archive of Russia on the detention of the Swedish diplomats and their interrogations, as well as interrogations of Wallenberg by the Political Directorate of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Ukrainian Front." Therefore, the future inquiries should be made in military archives.

### **3. Section of History of Foreign Trade of the Administration of the Ministry of Trade of the Russian Federation (Archive of the USSR Foreign Trade Ministry)**

1) Taking into consideration numerous deals of the Wallenberg bank with the Soviet Union during the war, especially the ball-bearing trade which was negotiated by and organized with the help of head of the Trade Department of the Soviet Legation in Stockholm Mikhail Nikitin, there should be numerous documentation about the Wallenberg bankers and the various trade deals in the archive of this ministry. Secret deals involving Wallenberg business and Nazi authorities may have also been conducted in Hungary from 1944-45. These issues may have a direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg's activities and possibly his fate. These documents have never been made available for review.

2) There is information that Raoul Wallenberg himself, as a representative of his company Mellaneuropeiska, was involved in negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm in 1944. In his last message to Wallenberg in December 1944, his business partner Koloman Lauer mentioned a plan that from Budapest Wallenberg could perhaps go to Moscow for business negotiations. All these actions should be documented in the correspondence between the Trade Department of the Soviet Legation in Stockholm with Moscow. Although this archive responded in 1999 that it "contains no information on the activities of the diplomat Raoul Wallenberg", this is not an answer to the activities of Wallenberg as a businessman. New inquiries regarding trade negotiations with Mellanoeupeiska (including closely related firms) and Nikitn's files in particular should be made.

### **IV. Presidential Archive**



Obviously, due to the importance of the case, the Presidential Archive might keep the key information about the case. The late General Dmitrii Volkogonov claimed that he had studied this archive, but it is unknown what materials and to what extent he was able to review. Since this archive is still inaccessible for independent researchers, it is impossible to verify if it has documents about the Wallenberg case. There are at least three issues that should be checked in this archive.

1) An analysis of the list of names of persons who attended the Politburo meeting in Stalin's office on August 9, 1947 shows that, most probably, the Vyshinsky Note (and, possibly, the whole Wallenberg case) was discussed at this meeting, when Abakumov was in Stalin's office from 23:00 to 23:30. Before him, Vyshinsky was in Stalin's office from 22:10-22:50. However, only on August 12 a Politburo decision regarding the MGB appeared in the Politburo records (P59/123). Additionally, copies of the final version of the Vyshinsky Note were sent to all attendees of this meeting, including Abakumov, plus Molotov and Mikoyan, who were absent at the meeting. Since such decisions were filed in the MGB Special Folder of the Politburo which is still classified, it is necessary to make an inquiry about these materials.

2) There is a direct evidence in MID's documents that Stalin's personal secretariat, called the Special Sector of the Central Committee, dealt with the Wallenberg case. On December 11, 1947, A. I. Kabashkin, head of the 5<sup>th</sup> Section (letters) of the Special Sector sent a Swedish letter, addressed to Stalin, to MID for MID's comments (the so-called A. I. Plakhin's information on the Wallenberg Case, 1952; p. 10; at the time, Plakhin was acting head of the 5<sup>th</sup> European Department of MID). Therefore, it is clear that at least the archive of the Special Sector should be checked for documents about Wallenberg.

3) Other MGB folders kept in the Presidential Archive, especially of the Soviet leaders involved in the case — Stalin, Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria — also need attention of researchers. They have never been declassified.

**V. Additional Issues That Also Need to Be Reviewed in Specific Archives.** Here are some examples:

1) Details of discussions between the Swedish physician Dr. Nanna Svartz and Soviet Academician Aleksandr Myasnikov from 1961 to 1965, when Dr. Svartz understood Dr. Myasnikov to claim that Wallenberg was still alive. Myasnikov's personal papers were requested for review but the request was denied. The Myasnikov/Svartz contacts were discussed at the highest levels of the Soviet leadership, including the Presidium. Only very few documents have been released. Such a review could clarify if Soviet officials had precise information what transpired in the Myasnikov/Svartz conversation, if

Myasnikov was reprimanded, or if he ever had been involved in the medical treatment of foreign prisoners.

2) The capture of the Soviet spy Stig Wennerstroem, a Swedish Air Force Colonel, in 1963 and the subsequent behind-the-scenes discussions, via East Germany, about using his arrest to press for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg.

3) The meeting in 1965 between Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, which led to the official closure of the Raoul Wallenberg case until 1979. This documentation would provide important insight for the reasons behind this step.

4) The internal high-level Soviet government and Communist Party discussions that preceded Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's invitation to Moscow of Raoul Wallenberg's relatives in 1989 (only partial records of Politburo meetings of the period have been released).

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Clearly, in order to be able to draw any valid conclusions about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg in MGB hands it is necessary to continue the archival work. Where ever possible, researchers must be allowed to review documents in the original and in the context of the files.

Much more should be done to discover the possible reasons for Wallenberg's arrest and why he was not released — checking what Soviet secret services knew about his business, political and, possibly, intelligence contacts in Sweden and Hungary from 1941-1945.

In order to assist professional historians in their efforts, Swedish officials should continue to remind Russian officials of their stated commitment to provide independent professional historians with full access to the necessary archival materials. In cases when Russian officials refuse access to the key materials, Sweden should place a formal request to review the records in question.

Ideally, independent researchers should closely coordinate their efforts and seek a systematic, coordinated approach to the Wallenberg case. They should create a set of the currently most pressing questions and suggest methods for resolving them, in close cooperation with the Russian authorities. Such a group of professional historians should be provided with the necessary authority to review all types of archival documents, including still classified materials.